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Abstract 
The increasing adoption of Cloud-based data processing and storage poses 
a number of privacy issues. Users wish to preserve full control over their 
sensitive data and cannot accept it to be fully accessible to an external storage 
provider. Previous research in this area was mostly addressed at techniques to 
protect data stored on untrusted database servers; however, I argue that the 
Cloud architecture presents a number of specific problems and issues. This 
dissertation contains a detailed analysis of open issues. To handle them, I 
present a novel approach where confidential data is stored in a highly 
distributed partitioned database, partly located on the Cloud and partly on the 
clients.  
In my approach, data can be either private or shared; the latter is shared in a 
secure manner by means of simple grant-and-revoke permissions. I have 
developed a proof-of-concept implementation using an in-memory RDBMS 
with row-level data encryption in order to achieve fine-grained data access 
control. This type of approach is rarely adopted in conventional outsourced 
RDBMSs because it requires several complex steps. Benchmarks of my proof-
of-concept implementation show that my approach overcomes most of the 
problems.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing, today, provides users with readily available, pay-as-you-go 
computing and storage power, allowing them to dynamically adapt their 
Information Technology (IT) costs to their needs [23]. With Cloud computing, 
users need neither huge investments in the start-up phase nor costly 
competence in IT system management. 
While the Cloud computing concept is drawing much interest, several 
obstacles remain to its widespread adoption [23], including:  
 Current limits of ICT infrastructure: network availability, reliability, 
and quality of service; 
 Differences in the development process of Cloud applications with 
respect to ordinary ones; and, importantly, 
 Privacy risks for confidential information residing in the Cloud.  
Thanks to increasing network availability, the first obstacle is becoming lesser 
and lesser of an issue over time; the second will tend to disappear with the 
training of new developers and by introducing new software development 
methods; the third obstacle, however, is far from being solved and may 
seriously impair the real prospects of Cloud computing. 
This is particularly the case for Public Clouds [3], i.e., those available, upon 
subscription, to the general public (as opposed to Private Clouds operated by 
large enterprises and organizations for their employees). 
Nowadays, the use of Public Clouds is becoming more and more frequent, 
thanks to productivity and collaboration tools (e.g. Google Apps1 , Zimbra2 , 
                                                 
1  www.google.com/a 
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etc.), online social networks (such as Facebook3  and LinkedIn4 ), etc. Those 
applications/services store a lot of information on the Cloud, many of which is 
confidential. Hence, a strong data access control is needed to prevent 
unauthorized uses. Typically, external access to shared data held in the Cloud 
goes through the usual authentication, authorization, and communication 
phases.  
The access control problem is well acknowledged in the database literature 
and the available approaches guarantee a high degree of assurance. For the 
traditional datacenters’ scenario, where storage is internal to the Enterprise 
and considered trusted, the attacks are expected from the outside. When data 
is outsourced, though, even the data storage and its administrators are 
external to the Enterprise. Therefore, the requirement that the maintainer of 
the datastore may not access or alter the outsourced data is not easily met. 
This is especially the case for commercial Public Clouds like Google App 
Engine for Business, Microsoft Azure Platform or Amazon EC2 platform. 
The privacy issue of Cloud environment is not only related to the datastore 
protection in untrusted servers. In a Cloud-based Data Center, a number of 
serious questions arise about the available services and the stored data [58]: 
 Who controls them? 
 Where are the servers located? 
 Where is the data stored? 
 Which legislation applies to them? 
 Who backs up the servers? 
 Who has access to the servers? 
 How resilient is the service? 
 How do auditors observe? 
 How does users’ security-team engage? 
Hence, new categories of risks come up: 
                                                                                                                                            
2  www.zimbra.com 
3  www.facebook.com 
4  www.linkedin.com 
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 Control: many organizations are uncomfortable with having their data 
managed by systems and staff they neither know nor control; therefore 
the providers must offer a high degree of reputation, security, and 
transparency to win users’ confidence. 
 Privacy: migrating data to a shared computing infrastructure increases 
the potential for unauthorized exposure, privacy breaches, and data 
loss. Authentication and access control techniques, and data replication 
are crucial. 
 Compliance: often the keeping of sensitive data (e.g., customers’ 
identities) is regulated by strict national/international laws, such as the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)5  and the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX)6 . These and other regulations may severely 
limit the use of Clouds in practice. 
 Security Management: even the simplest task may end up behind layers 
of abstraction or performed by someone else. Providers must supply 
easy-to-use controls to manage security settings for application and 
run-time environments. 
In a well-attended keynote address at ICWS 2010 [58], Elisa Bertino has 
summarized the most important security threats emerged in some of the last 
conferences about Cloud computing: 
 Abuse and Nefarious Use of Cloud Computing 
 Insecure Application Programming Interfaces 
 Malicious Insiders 
 Shared Technology Vulnerabilities 
 Data Loss/Leakage 
 Account, Service & Traffic Hijacking 
 Unknown Risk Profile 
 Loss of governance 
 Lock-in 
 Isolation failure 
                                                 
5  http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-104publ191/content-detail.html 
6  http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ204/content-detail.html 
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 Compliance risks 
 Management interface compromise 
 Data protection 
 Insecure or incomplete data deletion 
 Malicious Insider 
 Privileged user access 
 Regulatory compliance 
 Data location 
 Data segregation 
 Recovery 
 Investigative support 
 Long-term viability. 
To complicate the scenario, the availability of many alternatives for Cloud 
sharing (Private, Public, Federated, and Hybrid) and delivery models (IaaS, 
PaaS, and SaaS) makes it difficult, if not impossible, to find universal solutions 
to privacy issues. 
Although there are a number of techniques for preserving privacy of 
outsourced data on untrusted database servers (see chapter 2-Background on 
data protection), I will argue that they cannot be applied directly to the Cloud, 
particularly in the case of Public Cloud. First, these techniques were designed 
for RDBMS, while newer and less structured data models are increasingly 
used on the Cloud (see Section 6.3 - Semantic datastore). Second, besides 
managing data storage, the Cloud hosts all application logic up to the 
presentation layer. Hence, if a Cloud supplier even becomes untrustworthy, it 
can intercept communications between data storage and application logic, can 
monitor the user application memory and can modify (e.g., using Aspect 
Programming) presentation software components used to display application 
output to the final users. 
Essentially, encryption-based techniques for safely outsourcing data to 
untrusted DBMS cannot guarantee the confidentiality of data in the Cloud. 
Even if the data layer is secured through encryption, at some points, on its 
path toward the user, the data will be in plaintext form, i.e., unprotected and 
vulnerable.  
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To maintain data privacy, this dissertation proposes to move the 
entire presentation layer of Cloud applications from Server to 
Client side.  
However, separating the data layer (which would stay in the Cloud) from the 
presentation logics (which would stay in the client) may lead to an inefficient 
cooperation between the two parts.  For this reason, I think it is better to move 
also the data layer into the client. 
To ensure seamless cooperation between the data layer and the presentation 
logic, I propose a highly distributed architecture that is composed of a set of 
local nodes that run the applications and store all the data. Data is replicated 
when needed on all the nodes that access it. The local copies shall be 
synchronized using a central service on the Cloud using encryption, in the 
protocol which I designed, to guarantee data protection during the 
synchronization phase.  
Moreover, the architecture I propose allows fine-grained data access control 
and has the capability to revoke the access rights to a local node. To achieve 
this result, a row-level encrypted database is used. Since this type of 
encryption is rarely adopted in conventional RDBMSs, as it requires several 
complex steps, I propose an extension to add this functionality to In-Memory 
DataBases. 
A test implementation of the architecture and of an extended IMDB was 
realized and used to benchmark the system. 
Finally, I studied and utilized a standard email server on the Cloud as 
Synchronizer, evaluating the impact of this choice in performance and 
scalability. 
1.1 Structure of this dissertation 
This thesis mainly consists of three parts. In the first one (Chapters 2-6) I 
want to give a survey of the state of the art, in particular of: 
 Data protection in outsourced database (protection techniques on 
untrusted servers, data access control, etc.), in Chap. 2; 
 Cryptography in databases (the various level of encryption and the 
granularity in database level encryption), in Chap. 3; 
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 In-memory databases, in Chap. 4; 
 Broadcast  in communication networks and Online Social Networks, in 
Chap. 5; 
 An analysis of Cloud Computing and the peculiarity of Privacy within 
the Cloud, with particular attention to the differences between the 
Cloud environment and the untrusted outsourced data servers, in Chap. 
6. 
In the second part (Chapters 7-10), I present the innovative work: 
 The UML complete layout of a distributed secure architecture for data 
sharing, in Chap. 7; 
 The Scenarios where the proposed system fits, in Chap. 8; 
 The structure, and the custom algorithms for secure data sharing, in 
Chap. 9; 
 A self-assessment of what has been achieved, and a comparison with 
the original goals, in Chap. 10. 
The third part (Chapters 11-16) is dedicated to the pilot implementation and 
its testing, as a way to validate the framework: 
 Implementation and benchmarking, in Chap. 11; 
 Further enhancement to improve scalability of the system, in Chap. 12; 
 Comparison with other approaches, in particular with Broadcast 
Encryption, in Chap. 13; 
 Vulnerability assessment, a key to prevent possible attacks, in Chap. 14; 
 The scenarios for a successful deployment of my system, in Chap. 15, 
and 
 Conclusion and future works, in Chap. 16. 
 19 
Part I - Background and  
state of the art 
 20 
2 BACKGROUND ON DATA 
PROTECTION 
This chapter presents the most important privacy issues in databases outsourcing on 
untrusted servers. I illustrate the main techniques for providing data protection and for 
securing the confidentiality of data stored at external honest-but-curious servers. Then, I 
discuss the state of the art of access control to outsourced data, describing how data can be 
selectively accessed from users and how access rights may change over time.  
2.1 Outsourced storage on untrusted servers  
Data storage involves high costs because it requires physical resources 
(disks, servers, etc.), frequent management procedures (backup, tuning, etc.), 
and skilled administrative staff. 
A cheaper solution is data outsourcing to a specialized provider that takes care 
of the storage within its own specialized structure to offer high availability and 
disaster protection [108]. Delegating data management to outsourced 
untrusted entity implies a risk for confidentiality and privacy, and a potential 
improper use of database information (harvesting, targeting, reselling, etc.) by 
the provider itself [15], since traditional access control techniques prevent 
data access by external users, but not by internal administrators (DBA).  
The main issues for guaranteeing proper protection and access to outsourced 
data are [6]: 
 Data protection: the storage server is responsible of data management 
but should not be authorized to know the actual data content. To 
achieve this goal, almost all the proposed approaches in literature 
employ encryption to secure customers’ data [95][106][109], or on 
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splitting (fragments of the original data) across several or tables 
[110][111][112]. 
 Query execution: if the server stores encrypted information, it is not 
able to execute the users’ queries, at most  it could send the encrypted 
tables involved in the query to the requester, which, then, needs to 
decrypt and query by herself [15]. Also in case of fragmentation, the 
client needs some logic to recombine different subqueries [6]. To 
decrease the client overhead, we try to process the request as far as 
possible on the server, leaving the client with a task of finishing. For 
this purpose, a set of indexes may be added to the encrypted 
information [114][115][109]. The response of server is a trade-off 
between precision (the fraction of the information retrieved that is 
relevant to the user's information need[113]) and privacy, because a 
precision too close to 1 allows statistical data mining, while a precision 
too far from 1 overloads the client. 
 Private access: the server may not inference information storing and 
analyzing the queries. This lead to the concept of oblivious searches on 
public key encrypted data [116]. 
 Data integrity and correctness: in addiction to honest-but-curious 
servers, which are untrusted w.r.t. data access but trusted w.r.t. 
properly enforcing data storage and management, we have also to 
consider totally untrusted server, which can alter stored data or 
queries’ results. In this case, a mechanism to check integrity and 
correctness of data is needed. It may be based on signatures attached to 
tuples in the database [117][118], or on chain structures as skip lists 
[119] that allow the client to the integrity of the returned tuples.  
 Access control enforcement: usually, the existing database access 
control mechanisms assume that the server is in charge of defining and 
enforcing access control. In the case of outsourced data, instead, it is 
unfeasible since the access control policy itself might be sensitive (and 
so it needs to be hidden to the server), access control restrictions might 
depend on the data content (that the server may not read), and an 
untrusted server may alter the access control. At the same time, it is not 
possible to give in charge the access control to data owner, to filter out 
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from the query result the tuples that a client cannot access, because it is 
too expensive and it brings to bottlenecks. A feasible way is the use of 
different encryption keys for different data as proposed, for example, 
for XML documents [121]. To access such encrypted data, users have to 
decrypt them by using the appropriate key. If different users know 
different keys, they have different access rights [120]. 
 Support for selective write privileges: the previous problem considers 
only the “read” access control, but the same happens for “write” access.  
 Data publication and utility: given a database instance containing 
sensitive information, it needs to be "anonymized" to obtain a view 
such that attackers cannot learn any sensitive information from the 
view, and legitimate users can use it to compute useful statistics [122]. 
Data protection and utility can be seen as conflicting goals: the more 
data are encrypted or obfuscated, the less the ability to withdraw 
knowledge and inferences from them. 
 Private collaborative computation: sometimes, the data that comes to a 
client is the result of interaction between many servers that collaborate 
to accomplish a service. In this case, the goal is to perform the 
computation on each server without revealing the data used to the 
extern [123][124].  
2.2 Data protection techniques 
To prevent a server from accessing data stored on its own machines, the 
literature reports three major families of data protection techniques on 
untrusted servers [6]:  
 Data encryption [15]; 
 Data fragmentation and encryption [16], which in turn can be classified 
into two major techniques 
o non-communicating servers [17][18]; 
o unlinkable fragments [19], and 
 Data fragmentation with owner involvement [20]. 
The goal of each of these techniques is to store data on the untrusted server in 
an inaccessible format, using encryption and/or fragmentation, to prevent 
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provider’s access to stored information. In all the scenarios, we can see four 
actors [15], as represented in Figure 1: 
1. An outsourced server that operates on behalf of one or more data 
owners that outsource their data, 
2. A data owner that store information into the server, 
3. A human user that queries the database, and 
4. A client software that elaborates locally the queries. 
 
Figure 1 The actors in protected outsourced storage 
The process is: 
1. The data owner stores information into the server accordingly with the 
used technique (e.g. after having encrypted the information); 
2. The server stores this data;  
3. When a user wants to access data, she creates a Db query Q1 . The query 
is processed by the client software that manipulates it to obtain an 
equivalent query Q2  that is processable by the server (that cannot 
directly access data content). The latter elaborates Q2  and sends the 
result set (a superset of the result set of Q1 ), to the client, which post-
processes it to delete the spurious results and to obtain the right result 
set of Q1 . 
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2.2.1 Data encryption  
If data is outsourced to an untrusted RDBMS (Relational Data Base 
Management Systems), to prevent unauthorized access by the datastore 
manager (DM) of the outsourced, it may be stored in encrypted form. The 
encryption happens on client side, before sending data for storage to the 
external server. 
2.2.1.1 Data Model  
While data can be encrypted at various granularity levels (see Section 3), for 
balancing client workload and query execution efficiency, most proposals 
assume that the database is encrypted at tuple level [6]. For the same reason, 
symmetric encryption is usually preferred over asymmetric encryption since it 
is cheaper [125]. 
Obviously, the DM does not know the encryption keys, which are stored apart 
from the data; the RDBMS receives an encrypted database and works on bit-
streams that only the clients, who hold the decryption keys, can interpret 
correctly.  
In current systems, decryption keys are generated and distributed to trusted 
clients by the data owner or by a trusted delegate [110]. 
It is important to remark that, since data is encrypted, the DBMS cannot index 
it based on plaintext and therefore it cannot resolve all queries.  
Some proposals [24][95][109] solve this problem by providing, for each 
encrypted field to be indexed, an additional indexable field, obtained by 
applying a non-injective transformation f to plaintext values (e.g., a hash of 
the field's content).  
Formally [15], given a plaintext database B, each table ri over schema Ri(Ai1 ,…, 
Ain), where Ri is the i-th relation and Aj the j-th attribute, in B is mapped onto 
a table rik over schema Rik (ID, Etuple, I1 ,…, In) in the corresponding encrypted 
database Bk, where: 
 ID is a numerical attribute added as primary key of the encrypted table; 
 Etuple is the attribute containing the encrypted tuple whose value is 
obtained applying an encryption function Ek to the plaintext tuple, 
where k is the secret key; and  
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 Ij is the index associated with the j-th attribute in Ri.  
Encrypted tuples and indexes can be stored in the same or in a separate table 
[13]. Conventionally, index values are represented with Greek letters. 
Figure 2 shows the transformation of a plain text tuple into an encrypted one. 
 
Figure 2 Data encryption, source: [6] 
 
2.2.1.2 Query execution 
The presence of indexes allows doing most of the work to answer a query at 
server side. Referring to Figure 1, when the user U, which needs not be aware 
that data have been outsourced to a third party, issues a query Q, the latter is 
passed to the client C, which splits it in Qs, which will be executed on the 
server, and Qc, which will be executed on the client. Qs  works on the encrypted 
tables through indexes, and produces a result set RSe (a set of the encrypted 
tuples) that is a superset of RS, the result set for Q. However, due to index 
collisions the transformed query may return spurious tuples, that is, tuples 
that do not belong to RS; for this reason, C receives RSe and, using Qc, filters 
the spurious tuples and performs the needed projections, obtaining RS, which 
is returned to U [15]. 
2.2.1.3 Indexing techniques 
Since a client may have a limited storage and computation capacity, one of the 
primary goals of the query execution process is to minimize the workload at 
the client side , while maximizing the operations that can be computed at the 
server side [120][109]. Different index approaches allow the execution of 
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different types of queries at server-side. In the following, I discuss the main 
type of indexes. 
1.1.1.1.1 Index by encryption 
Each search key value is encrypted using an invertible encryption function 
Ek(). A query on a plaintext relation has to be transformed into a query on the 
corresponding encrypted relation by simply applying the encryption function 
on each value specified in the original query. This technique is simple and has 
the advantage of preserving the distinction between values, but it is often 
possible to guess the correspondence between plaintext and encrypted values 
based on frequency analysis, that is, by comparing the distributions of the 
plaintext values in the plain-text relations with the corresponding 
distributions of the encrypted values [120]. 
1.1.1.1.2 Bucket-Based Index 
This is a variant of the previous technique that reduces, however without 
solving, the risk of inference analysis increasing the number of collisions 
among search values. The domain D of search values is mapped into a set of 
non overlapping partitions P={p1 ,..,pk} whose union covers all D. The index 
does not contain the single value of a tuple, but its equivalence class 
(partition) [109]. 
Using Bucket-Based Index, equality queries can be performed easily, although 
the result set needs to have a precision index < 1 to prevent statistical data 
mining. The trusted client, after receiving the encrypted result set, can decrypt 
it and exclude spurious tuples. Also, range queries are difficult to compute, 
since the transformation f in general shall not (and should not) preserve the 
order relation of the original plaintext data. Specifically, it will be impossible 
for the outsourced RDBMS to answer range queries that cannot be reduced to 
multiple equality conditions (e.g., 1<=x<=3 can be translated into x=1 or x=2 
or x=3) unless specific techniques are applied [109]. An efficient way for 
partitioning the domain of attributes, to minimize the number of spurious 
tuples in the result of a range/equality query, is shown in [126]. 
 
1.1.1.1.3 Index by hashing 
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Bucketing preserves the relation between two adjacent values. Instead, 
using a secure one-way hash function f 7, which takes as input the clear values 
of an attribute and returns the corresponding index values, we obtain the 
same result, but without the proximity relationship [13]. f has two interesting 
properties: 
 Since y=f(x) has a smaller bit-length than x, we still have collisions; and 
 A secure hash function uniformly covers its range (i.e., the output 
probabilities from the hash function are uniform). 
The resulting distribution of hash values is more dispersive, making 
frequency-based attacks ineffective. 
1.1.1.1.1.  Auxiliary B+-tree 
To handle range queries, a solution, among others, is to use an encrypted 
version of a B+-tree to store plaintext values and to maintain the ordering 
[106].  
Definition [127]: A B+-tree of order m is a tree where each internal node 
contains up to m branches (children nodes) and thus store up to m -1 search 
key values. m is also known as the branching factor or the fanout of the tree.  
 The B+-tree stores records (or pointers to actual records) only at the 
leaf nodes, which are all found at the same level in the tree, so the tree 
is always height balanced.  
 All internal nodes, except the root, have between ⌈m/2⌉ and m 
children  
 The root is either a leaf or has at least two children.  
 Internal nodes store search key values, and are used only as 
placeholders to guide the search. The number of search key values in 
each internal node is one less than the number of its non-empty 
children, and these keys partition the keys in the children in the fashion 
of a search tree. The keys are stored in non-decreasing order (i.e. sorted 
in lexicographical order).  
                                                 
7  f must be deterministic and non-injective 
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 Depending on the size of a record as compared to the size of a key, a 
leaf node in a B+-tree of order m may store more or less than m records. 
Typically this is based on the size of a disk block, the size of a record 
pointer, etcetera. The leaf pages must store enough records to remain at 
least half full.  
 The leaf nodes of a B+-tree are linked together to form a linked list. This 
is done so that the records can be retrieved sequentially without 
accessing the B+-tree index. This also supports fast processing of range-
search queries as will be described later.  
Figure 3 represents an example of a B+-tree. 
 
Figure 3 A B+-tree sample 
To adapt to encrypted databases, the B+-tree is built as plaintext structure, 
and then each node is encrypted (to protect the sensitive data) as in Figure 4: 
 
Figure 4 An encrypted B+-tree, source: [15] 
Since data values are encrypted, the tree is managed at the Client side and it is 
read-only in the Server side.  
This structure allows the client to make range queries. The client, starting 
from the root node, traverses the index. At each step, the client receives an 
encrypted node of the index, decrypts it, evaluates its content and then 
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traverses the tree as usual for BST, asking the server for the next node, until 
reaching a leaf [14].  
1.1.1.1.1  Other Approaches 
The previous indexing methods are not the only proposals. Table 1 
summarizes other approaches that try to better support SQL clauses or to 
reduce the amount of spurious tuples in the result produced by the remote 
server, and the supported queries: 
Table 1 Indexing methods supporting queries [15] 
Index Query8 
Equality Range Aggregation 
Bucket-based + O - 
Hash-based + - O 
B+ Tree + + + 
Character oriented + O - 
Privacy homomorphism + - + 
Partition Plaintext and 
Ciphertext (PPC) 
+ + + 
Order Preserving 
Encryption Schema 
(OPES) 
+ + O 
Secure index data 
structures 
+ O - 
 
2.2.2 Data fragmentation  
Often, not all the outsourced data, but only some columns and/or some 
relations are confidential, e.g. the relation between patient and illness, in 
medical field. In this case, it is possible to split the outsourced information in 
two parts, one confidential and the other public. The aim of this solution is to 
minimize the computational load of encryption/decryption.  
A confidentiality constraint c over relational schema R(A1 ,…,An) is a subset of 
attributes of R, i.e. c ⊆ R. Confidentiality constraints can contain a single 
attribute that is sensitive (singleton constraints) or a group of attributes that 
need to be never stored together since their joint visibility is sensitive 
(association constraints). 
Figure 5 shows an example of medical data and a set of well-defined 
constraints over it. 
                                                 
8  +=fully supported, o=partially supported, -=not supported. 
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Figure 5 A fragmentation sample (a) and a set of well-defined constraints 
over it (b), source: [128] 
2.2.2.1 Non-communicating servers  
In this technique, two split databases are stored each in a different 
untrusted server (called, say, S1  and S2 ). The two untrusted servers need to be 
independent and non-communicating to prevent their alliance and 
reconstruction of the complete information. In this scenario, the information 
may be stored encoded or as plaintext at each server [110]. Basically, sensitive 
attributes (singleton constraints) need to be encrypted, while sensitive 
associations can be protected by splitting (fragmenting) the involved 
attributes among the two servers. 
Given a relational schema R, a fragmentation of R is then a triple (F1 , F2, E), 
where fragments F1  and F2  contain a set of attributes in the clear (including a 
tuple identifier to ensure lossless decomposition) and a set E of attributes 
encrypted (i.e., E ⊆ F1  and E ⊆ F2 ).  
Figure 6 shows a correct fragmentation for the sample in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 6 A correct fragmentation sample, source: [128] 
Encrypted attributes and tuple identifier are contained in F1  as in F2 . F1  and F2  
are then stored respectively in S1  and S2 . 
Figure 7 schematizes the resulting structure. 
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Figure 7 Non-communicating servers 
 
1.1.1.1.4 Query execution 
The client decomposes each query Q in two subqueries: Q1 , which is executed 
in S1  on the fragment F1  giving the result set RS1 , and Q2 , which is executed in 
S2  on the fragment F2  giving the result set RS2 . If needed, the join between RS1  
and RS2  is made choosing one of these strategies: 
 Execute Q1  and Q2  in parallel, and then the client joins RS1  and RS2 ; 
 Execute first one sub-query (say it is Q1  in S1 ), then send RS1  to S2  to 
execute Q2  and to make the join with RS1. RS2  is the final result set to 
return to client. 
While the first strategy is heavier since are larger and the client needs local 
computing, the second exposes some plaintext data to one of the server, and 
then is potentially dangerous [110]. 
2.2.2.2 Unlinkable fragments  
In practice, it is not easy to ensure that split servers do not communicate; 
therefore the previous technique may be almost inapplicable. A possible 
remedy is to divide the information in two or more fragments. Each fragment 
contains all the fields of the original information, but some are in clear-text 
while the others are encrypted [19].  
E.g., given the relation R=(SSN, Name, DoB, Zip, Treatment, Illness), the 
physical fragments corresponding to its fragmentation F ={ {Name, DoB ,Zip}, 
{Illness}, {Treatment } } are illustrated in Figure 8: 
DB1 DB2
Server Server
Desktop
 32 
 
Figure 8 A fragmentation with encryption sample, source: [6] 
Here, enc contains the encryption of all the attributes that are not in plaintext. 
To protect enc from the so-called frequency attacks, a suitable salt is applied 
to it. These fragments may be stored in one or more servers. Figure 9 
schematizes the resulting structure. 
 
Figure 9 Unlinkable fragments 
 
1.1.1.1.5 Choice of fragments 
Generally, given a relational schema R and a set C of confidentiality 
constraints over it, different fragmentations may exist that are both correct 
and non-redundant [128]. The designer must choose wisely to ensure that the 
information cannot be reconstructed. In particular, care should be taken to 
not leave clear-text primary / external keys that could allow reconstructing the 
entire information (the chosen fragments need to be unlinkable). Moreover, 
among the correct fragmentations, the designer has to choose a solution that 
provides minimality. If minimality is characterized by the minimum number 
of fragments, the problem is NP-hard. An alternative definition of minimality 
DB1 DB2
Server
Desktop
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assumes that a solution is minimal if merging any two fragments would break 
at least a confidentiality constraint; using this definition, a heuristic approach 
is proposed in [19]. 
Some tools exist that allow, given a relation table, to produce views (vertical 
fragments) over it, in such a way to protect the privacy of possible sensitive 
information while providing maximal visibility over the data. A sample of 
these tools is Pri-views9 . It is based on a greedy algorithm designed by 
University of Bergamo (UNIBG) and University of Milano (UNIMI) to solve 
the problem of creating unlinkable fragments in the storage of sensitive 
attributes [20]. The used algorithm departs from the use of encryption, while, 
usually, in the literature, this kind of problem has been addressed using both 
fragmentation and encryption.  
1.1.1.1.6 Query execution 
Having plaintext attributes, the queries that can be resolved using only them 
are very efficient since they do not need decryption. 
At query time, the original query is then decomposed in two subqueries:  
 The first, executed on the Server, chooses a fragment (all fragments 
contain the entire information) and selects tuples from it according to 
clear-text values. It returns a result set where some fields are 
encrypted;  
 The second, executed on the Client (only if encrypted fields are involved 
in the query), decrypts the information and removes the spurious 
tuples.  
An example of query in unlinkable fragments scenario is represented in Table 
2: 
                                                 
9  http://www.primelife.eu/results/opensource/60-pri-views 
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Table 2 Query translation using unlinkable fragments [6] 
  
2.2.3 Data fragmentation with owner involvement  
An adaptation of the non-communicating-servers technique consists of 
storing locally the sensitive data and relations, while outsourcing storage of 
the generic data [16], as shown in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10 Data fragmentation with owner involvement 
The original relational schema R is split in <Fo, Fs>, where the former is stored 
at the data owner, and the latter is stored at the external server. Both have a 
common tuple identifier, to reconstruct the original relation. 
Figure 11 shows a fragmentation for the sample in Figure 5. 
DB1
DB2
Server
Desktop
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Figure 11 An example of physical fragments with owner involvement, 
source: [6] 
The fragmentation <Fo, Fs> of the relational schema R is considered correct if 
it satisfies the following conditions:  
 All attributes in R should appear in at least one fragment, to avoid loss 
of information; and 
 Fs should not violate any confidentiality constraint; 
It need to be non-redundant (Fo and Fs have no attribute in common) to avoid 
unnecessary storage at the data owner side and replica management problems 
[6]. 
To compute a fragmentation to reduce as possible the data owner’s workload, 
a metric for measuring the cost of a fragmentation is needed. In [16], four 
metrics are proposed to respond to different minimization goals: 
 Min-Attr: minimizes the number of attributes in Fo; 
 Min-Size: minimizes the physical size of the attributes in Fo; 
 Min-Query: minimizes the number of queries that involve at least one 
attribute in Fo; 
 Min-Attr: minimizes the number of conditions in queries that are 
evaluated over attributes in Fo; 
Since the problem is NP-hard, a heuristic algorithm was proposed in [16] to 
easily adapt to different metrics. 
1.1.1.1.7 Query execution 
A user query Q must be translated by the client in the queries Qo and Qs on Fo 
and Fs, respectively, plus a Qso that combines the resulting sets of Qo and Qs. Qs 
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is a query that operates only on attributes on the server, while Qo is a query 
that can be evaluated only by the data owner. 
The translation process can use server-owner or owner-server strategy [128]. 
In the former, Qs is evaluated on the server and then the result is sent to the 
owner, which proceeds with the evaluation of Qo and Qso. In the latter, Qo is 
evaluate on the owner, then Qs is evaluate on the server side and, in the end, 
Qso is evaluate again in the owner side. 
An example of the two different strategies for the query  
select Name from MedicalData where Illness=’Asthma’ and zip=’26013’ 
on fragmentation of Figure 11is condensed in Table 3 [128]: 
Table 3 Query translation in fragmentation with owner involvement  
 
2.3 Selective access  
In many scenarios, access to data is selective, with different users having 
different views over the data. Access control can discriminate between read 
and write operations on an entire record or only on a part of it.  
Key management solutions for outsourced databases can be classified in three 
categories: owner side policy enforcement solutions, user-side policy 
enforcement solutions, and solutions where access policy is shared among 
actors (owner/user/server) [7].  
An intuitive way to handle this issue is to encrypt different portions of data 
with different keys that are then distributed to users (according to their access 
privileges) [120]. 
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Limiting our scope to read operations, the access rights defined by the data 
owner can be represented by using an access matrix A, where rows correspond 
to subjects, columns correspond to objects, and entry A [ s; o ] is set to 1  if s 
has permission to access o; 0 (zero) otherwise [29]. An example is represented 
in Figure 12: 
 
Figure 12 An example of access matrix 
The column i of matrix corresponds to the Access Control Lists (ACL i) of the 
tuple ti, while the row j corresponds to the capability list (CAPj) of user uj. 
The simplest solution for access control consists in encrypting each tuple in 
the outsourced database with a different key and assigning to each user the set 
of keys associated with the tuples she can access; but this solution brings to 
the proliferation of a lot of keys per user. 
Access control policies can be translated into equivalent encryption policies 
guided by two basic requirements [6][120]:  
 No more than one key is released to each user, and 
 Each resource is encrypted not more than once.  
In [29][120], to achieve these objectives, a hierarchical organization of keys 
has been envisioned. Basically, users with the same access privileges are 
grouped and each resource is encrypted with a key that corresponds to the set 
of users that can access it. In this way, a single key can be used to encrypt 
more than one resource. The authors consider a user hierarchy whose 
elements are all the possible sets of users in the system together with the 
partial order (≤) naturally induced on it by the subset containment 
relationship. Each user group has associated the tuples whose ACL, defined in 
the access matrix, corresponds to the group itself. A directed acyclic graph 
(DAG) with a node for each set of users, and an edge from node Y to node X if 
X ≤ Y represents the user hierarchy (an example of it is shown in Figure 13). 
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Figure 13 An example of user hierarchy, source: [29] 
By assuming that each node of the hierarchy is associated with a key, the 
access control problem could b e solved by encrypting each tuple with the key 
of the node corresponding to its ACL and by assigning to each user the set of 
keys of the nodes to which she belongs. On this basis, a heuristic algorithm 
that minimizes the total number of distributed keys delivered to all the users 
was proposed in [129].  
An alternative solution (that is based on the same kind of above rights matrix, 
but builds a binary tree whose intrinsic properties contribute to reduce key 
management complexity) was proposed in [130]. Each level of the binary tree 
corresponds to the rights of a user profile. Each user receives the key 
corresponding to her hierarchical level; using it, she can derive all the keys for 
allowed data using derivation mechanisms. Since few keys are assigned for 
user at the top of the hierarchy, while those situated in the bottom receive a 
bigger number of keys, a preliminary sort of user profiling, based on the right 
importance, is used to minimize the average number of delivered keys. 
A solution that organizes data in a binary tree and use also derivation 
mechanisms was proposed in [131]. Since it does not follow any defined data 
placement strategy to group data according to user rights, as the previous 
works did, and allowed data could be disseminated on different parts of the 
binary tree (to avoid data disclosure), the number of received keys could grow 
very quickly especially in a scenario of billion of data blocks [7]. 
 39 
A two level encryption scheme, one before outsourcing data, done by the 
owner and the second, in case of user or role revocation, done by the service 
provider, was proposed in [132]. 
2.4 Dynamic rights management  
A user’s rights may change over time (e.g., the user changes role or 
department). Therefore removing users from group/roles becomes necessary. 
If the key management is not dynamic, this can be achieved on outsourced 
databases as follows [134]:  
 Encrypt data by a new key; 
 Remove the original encrypted data, and 
 Send the new key to the rest of the group.  
The user, unless the database is re-keyed, continues to have access to the data 
[7]. Note that the data owner must perform these operations since the 
untrusted DBMS has no access to the keys. This active role of the data owner , 
however, goes somewhat against the reasons for choosing to outsource data in 
the first place.  
In [7], the authors, exploiting the never-ending trend to lower price-per-
byte storages, propose to replicate n times the source database, where n is the 
number of different roles having access to the database. Each database replica 
is a view, entirely encrypted using the key  created for the corresponding role. 
Each time a role is created, the corresponding view is generated and encrypted 
with a new key, expressly generated for the newly -created role. Users do not 
own the real keys, but receive a token that allows them to address a request-
to-cipher to a set KS of key servers on the Cloud.  
Another important issue, common to many access control policies, concerns 
time-dependent constraints on access permissions [9]. In many real 
situations, it is likely that a user may be assigned a certain role only for a 
limited time. In such case, users need a different key for each time period. A 
time-bound hierarchical key assignment scheme is a method to assign time-
dependent encryption keys and private information to each class in the 
hierarchy. Key derivation will depend also on temporal constraints; once a 
role’s time period expires, users in that role need to be re-authorized. 
 40 
2.5 References 
 [6] Pierangela Samarati and Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati: “Data protection in outsourcing scena rios: issues and 
directions”, ASIACCS 2010, pp. 1-14 
[7] Nadia Bennani, Ernesto Damiani, and Stelvio Cimato: “Toward Cloud-based key management for outsourced 
databases”, Computer Software and Applications Conference Workshops (COMPSACW), 2010 IEEE 34th An nual, pp. 232-236 
[8] Mikhail J. Atallah, Marina Blanton, and Keith B. Frikken: “Incorporating Temporal Capabilities in Existing Key 
Management Schemes”, ESORICS 2007, pp. 515 -530 
[9] Alfredo De Santis, Anna Lisa Ferrara, and Barbara Masucci: “New construct ions for provably-secure time-bound 
hierarchical key assignment schemes”, Theor. Comput. Sci. 407, pp.213 -230 (2008) 
 [11] Fay Chang, Jeffrey Dean, Sanjay Ghemawat, Wilson C. Hsieh, Deborah A. Wallach, Michael Burrows, Tushar 
Chandra, Andrew Fikes, and Robert Gruber: “Bigtable: A Distributed Storage System for Structured Data”, OSDI 2006, pp. 205-
218 
[12] Victor R. Lesser: “Encyclopedia of Computer Science”, 4th edition. John Wiley and Sons Ltd. 2003, pp.1194 –1196 
[13] Ernesto Damiani, Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati, Sushil Jajodia, Stefano Paraboschi, and Pierangela 
Samarati:“Balancing confidentiality and efficiency in untrusted relational DBMSs”,ACM Conference on Computer and Comm. 
Security 2003, pp.93-102 
[14] Ernesto Damiani, Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati, Mario Finetti, Stefano Paraboschi, Pierangela Samarati, and 
Sushil Jajodia: “Implementation of a Storage Mechanism for Untrusted DBMSs”, IEEE Security in Storage Workshop 2003, pp. 
38-46 
[15] Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati, Sara Foresti, Stefano Paraboschi, and Pierangela Samarati: “Privacy of outsourced 
data”, In Alessandro Acquisti, Stefanos Gritzalis, Costos Lambrinoudakis, and Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati: Digital 
Privacy: Theory, Technologies and Practices. Auerbach Publications (Taylor and Francis Group) 2007 
[16] Valentina Ciriani, Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati, Sara Foresti, Sushil Jajodia, Stefano Paraboschi, and Pierangela 
Samarati: “Fragmentation and Encryption to Enforce Privacy in Data Storage”, ESORICS 2007, pp. 171 -186 
[17] Richard Brinkman, Jeroen Doumen, and Willem Jonker: “Using Secret Sharing for Searching”, in Encrypted Data. 
Secure Data Management 2004, pp. 18-27 
[18] Ping Lin and K. Selçuk Candan: “Secure and Privacy Preserving Outsourcing of Tree Structured Data”, Secure Data 
Management 2004, pp. 1-17 
[19] Valentina Ciriani, Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati, Sara Foresti, Sushil Jajodia, Stefano Paraboschi, and Pierangela 
Samarati: “Combining fragmentation and encryption to protect privacy in data storage”, ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 13(3): 
(2010) 
[20] Valentina Ciriani, Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati, Sara Foresti, Sushil Jajodia, Stefano Paraboschi, and Pierangela 
Samarati: “Keep a Few: Outsourcing Data While Maintaining Confidentiality”, ESORICS 2009, pp. 440 -455 
[24] Hakan Hacigümüs, Balakrishna R. Iyer, and Chen Li, Sharad Mehrotra: “Executing SQL over encrypted data in the 
database-service-provider model”, SIGMOD Conference 2002, pp. 216 -227 
[28] L. Bouganim and Y. Guo, “Database encryption,” in Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security, Springer, 2010, 2nd 
Edition 
[29] E. Damiani, S. De Capitani di Vimercati, S. Foresti, S. Jajodia, S. Paraboschi, and P. Samarati, “Key management for 
multi-user encrypted databases,” StorageSS, 2005, pp. 74 -83 
 [33] E. Damiani, S. De Capitani di Vimercati, S. Paraboschi and P. Samarati, “Computing range queries on obfuscated 
data,” IPMU, 2004 
[106] Alberto Ceselli, Ernesto Damiani, Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati, Sushil Jajodia, Stefano Paraboschi, Pierangela 
Samarati: Modeling and assessing inference exposure in encrypted databases. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. (TISSEC) 8(1):119 -
152 (2005) 
[107] Ernesto Damiani, Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati, Sara Foresti, Sushil Jajodia, Stefano Paraboschi, Pierangela 
Samarati: Metadata Management in Outsourced Encrypted Databases. Secure Data Management 2005:16-32 
[108] Ward, J, O’Sulllivan, M., Shahoumian, T ., and Wilkes, J. 2002. “Appia: Automatic storage area network fabric 
design. In Proceedings of the Conference on File and Storage Technologies” (FAST 2002) . The USENIX Association, 
Monterey, CA. 
 41 
[109] Hakan Hacigümüs, Bijit  Hore, Balakrishna R. Iyer, Sharad Mehrotra: Search on Encrypted Data. Secure Data 
Management in Decentralized Systems 2007:383-425 
[110] G. Aggarwal, M. Bawa, P. Ganesan, H. Garcia-Molina, K. Kenthapadi, R. Motwani, U. Srivastava, D. Thomas, and 
Y. Xu. Two can keep a secret: a distributed architecture for secure database services. In Proc. of the Second Biennial Conference 
on Innovative Data Systems Research (CIDR 2005), Asilomar, CA, USA, January 2005. 
[111] Valentina Ciriani, Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati, Sara Foresti, Sushil Jajodia, Stefano Paraboschi, Pierangela 
Samarati: Keep a Few: Outsourcing Data While Maintaining Confidentiality. ESORICS 2009:440 -455  
[112] Valentina Ciriani, Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati, Sara Foresti, Sushil Jajodia, Stefano Paraboschi, Pierangela 
Samarati: Combining fragmentation and encryption to protect privacy in data storage. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. (TISSEC) 
13(3) (2010) 
[113] Chris Buckley, Ellen M. Voorhees, Evaluating evaluation measure stability, In SIGIR '00: Proceedings of the 23rd 
annual international ACM SIGIR conference on Research and development in information retrieval (2000), pp. 33 -40. 
doi:10.1145/345508.345543 Key: citeulike:1296575 
[114] Agrawal, R. et al., Order preserving encryption for numeric data. In Weikum, G., Konig, A., and Deßloch, S., Eds., 
Proc. of the ACM SIGMOD 2004, Paris, France. ACM, 2004, 563. 
[115] Alberto Ceselli, Ernesto Damiani, Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati, Sushil Jajodia, Stefano Paraboschi, Pierangela 
Samarati: Modeling and assessing inference exposure in encrypted databases. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. (TISSEC) 8(1):119-
152 (2005) 
 [117] M. Xie, H. Wang, J. Yin, and X. Meng. Integrity auditing of outsourced data. In Proc. of the 33rd International 
Conference on Very Large Data Bases (VLDB 2007), Vienna, Austria, September 2007.  
[118] E. Mykletun, M. Narasimha, and G. Tsudik. Authentication and integrity in outsourced databases. ACM Transactions 
on Storage, 2(2):107–138, May 2006. 
[119] G. Di Battista and B. Palazzi. Authenticated relational tables and authenticated skip lists. In Proc. of the 21th IFIP 
WG11.3 Working Conference on Data and Application Security, Redondo Beach, CA, USA,  August 2007. 
[120] Ernesto Damiani, Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati, Sara Foresti, Sushil Jajodia, Stefano Paraboschi, Pierangela 
Samarati: Selective Data Encryption in Outsourced Dynamic Environments. Electr. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci. (ENTCS) 
168:127-142 (2007) 
[121] Miklau, G. and D. Suciu, Control ling access to published data using cryptography , in: Proc. of the 29th International 
Conference on Very Large Data Bases , Berlin, Germany, 2003  
[122] Vibhor Rastogi, Dan Suciu, Sungho Hong, “The boundary between privacy and utility in data publishing”, In VLDB 
'07: Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Very large data bases (2007), pp. 531 -542. 
[123] Florian Kerschbaum, Axel Schröpfer, Antonio Zilli, Richard Pibernik, Octavian Catrina, Sebastiaan de Hoogh, Berry 
Schoenmakers, Stelvio Cimato, Ernesto Damiani: Secure Collaborative Supply -Chain Management. IEEE Computer 
(COMPUTER) 44(9):38-43 (2011) 
[124] S. De Capitani di Vimercati, S. Foresti, S. Jajodia, S. Paraboschi, and P. Samarati. Controlled information sharing in 
collaborative distributed query processing. In Proc. of the 28th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems 
(ICDCS 2008), Beijing, China, June 2008. 
[125] Balakrishna R. Iyer, Sharad Mehrotra, Einar Mykletun, Gene T sudik, Yonghua Wu: A Framework for Efficient 
Storage Security in RDBMS. EDBT 2004:147-164 
[126] Hore , B., Me hrotra, S., and Tsudik, G., A privacy-preserving index for range queries. In Nascimento, M. et al., Eds., 
Proc. of t he 30th International Conference on Very Large Data Bases , Toronto, Canada. Morgan Kaufmann, 2004, 720.  
[127] Ramakrishnan Raghu, Gehrke Johannes - Database Management Systems, McGraw-Hill Higher Education (2000), 
2nd edition (en) page 267 
[128] M. Bezzi, S. De Capitani di Vimercati, S. Foresti, G. Livraga, S. Paraboschi, P. Samarati, “Data privacy” in 
Camenisch, Jan; Fischer-Hübner, Simone; Rannenberg, Kai, “Privacy and Identity Management for Life”, Springer 1st Edition., 
2011, XXIV, 512 p. 122 illus. 
[129] C. Blundo, S. Cimato, S. D. C. di Vimercati, A. D. Santis, S. Foresti, S. Paraboschi, and P. Samarati. Efficient key 
management for enforcing access control in outsourced scenarios. In SEC, pages 364 –375, 2009 
 42 
[130] V. El-khoury, N. Bennani, and A. M. Ouksel. Distributed key man-agement in dynamic outsourced databases: A trie-
based approach. In DBKDA ’09: Proceedings of the 2009 First International Conference on Advances in Databases, Knowledge, 
and Data Applications, pages 56–61, Washington, DC, USA, 2009. IEEE Computer Society.  
[131] W. Wang, Z. Li, R. Owens, and B. Bhargava. Secure and efficient access to outsourced data. In CCSW ’09: 
Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on Cloud computing security, pages 55 –66, New York, NY, USA, 2009. ACM. 
[132] S. D. C. di Vimercati, S. Forest i, S. Jajodia, S. Paraboschi, and P. Samarati. Over-encryption: management of access 
control evolution on outsourced data. In VLDB ’07: Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Very large data bases,  
pages 123–134. VLDB Endow-ment, 2007 
[133] Mikhail J. Atallah, Marina Blanton, Nelly Fazio, Keith B. Frikken: Dynamic and Efficient Key Management for 
Access Hierarchies. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. (TISSEC) 12(3) (2009)  
[134] XiuXia T ian, XiaoLing Wang, AoYing Zhou, "DSP RE-Encryption: A Flexible Mechanism for Access Control 
Enforcement Management in DaaS," Cloud Computing, IEEE International Conference on, pp. 25 -32, 2009 IEEE International 
Conference on Cloud Computing, 2009 
[1 4 6 ] Da v ida GI, Wells DL, Kam JB (1981) A Database Encryption System with subkeys. ACM Tran s.  Da ta ba se 
Sy st .  6 ,  3 1 2 -3 2 8 .  
[1 4 7 ] Bu ehrer D, Chang C (1991) A cryptographic mechan ism  for  sh a r in g  da ta ba ses.  Th e In ter n a t ion a l  
Con fer en ce on  In for m a tion  & Sy stem s. Ha n g zh ou , Ch in a , pp. 1 03 9 -1 04 5 .  
[1 4 8 ] [Chang C, Chan CW (2003) A Database Record Encryption Scheme Using RSA Public Key Cry ptosy stem  
a n d Its Ma ster  Key s.  Th e in ter n a t ion a l con fer en ce on  Com pu ter  n etw or ks a n d m obile com pu tin g .  
[1 4 9 ] Shmueli E, Waisenberg R, Elovici Y, Gudes E (2005) Designing secure indexes for encrypted da ta ba ses .  
Pr oceedings of Data and Applicat ion s Secu r ity ,  1 9 th  A n n u a l IFIP WG 1 1 .3  Wor kin g  Con fer en ce,  USA .  
[1 5 0] Kü hn U (2006) Analysis of a Database and Index Encryption Scheme – Problems and Fixes. Secu r e Da ta  
Ma n a g em en t.  
[1 5 1 ] Min -Shiang H, Wei-Pang Y (1997) Multilevel Secure Databa se En cr y ption  w ith  Su bkey s.  Da ta  a n d 
Kn ow ledg e En g in eer in g  2 2 , 1 1 7 -1 3 1 .  
 
  
 43 
3 CRYPTOGRAPHY IN DATABASES 
In this Chapter I analyse the different levels and granularity of database encryption, and the 
types of attack to database security. 
Confidentiality, integrity and availability are the main properties of 
database protection [135]. Confidentiality has been defined by the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) in ISO-177991 0  as 
"ensuring that information is accessible only to those authorized to have 
access"; data integrity assures that none can modify the information without a 
trace; availability provides access to data by authorized users in a reasonable 
time. Along the years, a lot of ACP (Access Control Policy) has been defined, 
based on database model (relational rather than object) and policy control 
(i.e., DAC-Discretionary Access Control, RBACC-Role Based Access Control, 
MAC-Mandatory Access Control)[139]. Traditionally, ACPs are based on the 
assumption that the DBA (DataBase Administrator) is trusted, but this 
assumption no longer holds in outsourced data centers and in the Cloud, 
where the platform-as-a-service (PaaS) provider is external to data owner. A 
solution to this problem is that the DBMS treats only raw-data, encrypted in 
such a way that DBA (or another intruder) cannot read the information. There 
are three main categories of database encryption [28][136]: storage level 
encryption, database level encryption, and application level encryption (as 
represented in Figure 15). 
                                                 
1  ISO/IEC 17799, Jan 4, 2009 
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Figure 15 The three options for database encryption level, source: [28] 
3.1 Storage-level encryption 
In Storage-level encryption (SLE), data is encrypted either at the file level 
(NAS/DAS) or at the block level (SAN) [152]. A short while ago, Toshiba has 
released a hardware implementation of SLE, a family of hard drives - called 
Self-Encrypting Disk1 1 . The system is based on the Opal specifications of 
Trusted Computing Group1 2 , supports native encryption AES 256 and can 
automatically delete its contents if not used by the rightful owner.  
This encryption is not selective; since the storage subsystem has no knowledge 
of database objects and structure, it encrypts an entire support or portions of 
support (i.e. directories or files), without respect to user privileges or to data 
sensitivity. When encrypting only portion of support, there is the additional 
risk that logs and temporary files remain plaintext. It prevents theft of storage 
but it is unsuitable for preventing unauthorized access by an honest-but-
curious system administrator, who must know the encryption key. On the 
other hand, it is entirely transparent to the system, so it needs no database 
modification [28]. 
                                                 
1 1  
http://storage.toshiba.com/main.aspx?Path=StorageSolutions/PCNotebook/
MKxx61GSYGSeries 
1 2  http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/developers/storage/specifications/ 
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3.2 Database-level encryption 
Database-level encryption (DLE) secures data as it is written to and read 
from a database. The encryption is applied to the Db at various granularities, 
such as database, tables, columns (most frequently), and rows. It can be 
related with some logical conditions for selecting affected data, too.  
Several database encryption schemes have been proposed in the literature, e.g. 
[136]: 
 In [146] a scheme based on the Chinese-Reminder theorem is 
proposed, where each row is encrypted using different sub-keys for 
different cells. This scheme enables encryption at the level of rows and 
decryption at the level of cells; 
 An extension of the previous scheme that supports multilayer access 
control is proposed in [151]. It classifies subjects and objects into 
distinct security classes that are ordered in a hierarchy, such that an 
object with a particular security class can be accessed only by subjects 
in the same or a higher security class; 
 The scheme presented in [147] proposes encryption for a database 
based on Newton's interpolating polynomials; 
 The scheme presented in [148] is based on the RSA public-key scheme 
and suggests two database encryption schemes: one column oriented 
and the other row oriented; 
 The SPDE scheme is presented in [149]. It encrypts each cell in the 
database individually together with its cell coordinates (table name, 
column name and row-id) to obtain different cipher-text values for 
equal plaintext values (against static analysis), and to prevent a tuple is 
moved to a different location (against splicing attacks) [150]. 
 
One disadvantage of all but the last these schemes is that the basic element in 
the database is a row and not a cell. Thus the structure of the database is 
modified. In addition, all of those schemes require re-encrypting the entire 
row when a cell value is modified. Thus, in order to perform an update 
operation, all the encryption keys should be available [28][136].  
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DLE is not transparent to application as SLE, so it involves some 
modifications to the indexed encrypted data and in stored procedures and 
triggers. The system is slowed down by the encryption overhead. Usually, it is 
not a defence from the curious DBAs [152]. 
3.3 Application-level encryption 
In Application-level encryption (ALE), data is encrypted/decrypted by the 
application that generates it. Plain-text data is made available only at client 
side, while data sent over the network is encrypted [153][95][13].  
The main advantages of this solution are:  
 The encryption keys and the encrypted data stored in the database are 
separated, since the keys never have to leave the application side; and 
 A high flexibility since the encryption granularity and the encryption 
keys can be chosen depending on application logic. 
The price to pay is that this scheme usually involves returning to the client 
larger result sets, which are then filtered at client side, when decrypted. To 
accomplish this result, applications need to be modified and the network 
traffic increases [28]. 
3.4 Granularity in database-level encryption 
Database-level encryption is the most common solution for data 
protection. It can have different types of granularity, namely  [28][136]: 
database, tables, columns, and rows. 
In [29] the granularity is divided into relation level, attribute level, tuple level, 
and element level, while [154] uses the taxonomy: attribute value, record/row, 
attribute/column, and page/block. 
3.4.1 Database 
In this case, the whole database is encrypted using only one key, as if it 
was a single file. The cons of this technique are: 
 It does not allow to define different privileges on each table; 
 The schema definition becomes particularly complex; 
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 The system performance suffers considerable degradation (an 
improvement can be achieved with appropriate caching) [152]; 
 Its security is closely linked to the physical security of the device with 
which the master key is kept. 
For these reasons, the database granularity solution is seldom used. 
3.4.2 Tables 
A specific key encrypts each table separately. Performances are better than 
the previous solution, but still very far from those of a clear-text database, 
because encrypting an existing table can be slow. Encryption affects 
performance only when data is retrieved from or inserted into an encrypted 
column. No reduction in performance occurs for operations involving 
unencrypted columns, even if these columns are in a table containing 
encrypted columns. Accessing data in encrypted columns involves small 
overheads (e.g., in an Oracle 11 database, the overhead associated with 
encrypting or decrypting an attribute is estimated to be around 5%) w.r.t. clear 
text data 1 3 . 
 
The total performance overhead depends on the number of encrypted 
columns and their frequency of access. The columns most appropriate for 
encryption are those containing the most sensitive data. The definition (and 
enforcement) of integrity constraints, foreign keys and indexes is very 
complex (see Section 2.2.1. on Data encryption). 
3.4.3 Columns 
All the data in a column (or set of columns) of a table is encrypted with the 
same key. This is the solution adopted by most DBMS suppliers, e.g. 
                                                 
1 3  
http://download.oracle.com/docs/cd/B28359_01/network.111/b28530/asotr
ans.htm 
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Transparent Data Encryption in Oracle 11G1 4  or Microsoft SQL Server1 5 , as it 
allows encrypting only sensitive data. However, it needs to build ad-hoc 
indexes customized for the expected queries (again, at the expense of 
performance). With this approach, it is also not possible to define access 
privileges on "horizontal" portions of a table such as row sets (e.g., allowing 
access only to rows with id> 100), as it is awkward to encrypt rows with 
different keys depending on the user. These mechanisms usually rely on third-
party applications, or otherwise are implemented using database triggers or 
stored procedures[152]. 
Although column-level encryption permits to reduce the encryption to only 
sensitive columns, it often results in worse performance because it breaks 
many of the indexing, query, and relational tools used by the DBMS [155]. 
3.4.4 Rows 
Each single row in a table is encrypted using a different key. The main 
advantage of this technique is the capability to define access control to a 
subset of data (rows) of a table basing on the distribution of decryption keys. 
Let us assume that we have a table that includes the data of all students in a 
university and we want to grant access to the secretary of each course only to 
data of students enrolled in that course. If we were using database or table-
level encryption, we would have to create a view for each course and grant the 
rights to the corresponding secretary, with the problems outlined above (also, 
data stays readable by the DBAs). Using column-level encryption, the 
permissions must be specified at the field level and, unless appropriate 
indexes or cumbersome procedures are implemented (which may also expose 
the data to inference or statistical attacks), it would be impossible to make the 
information instantly accessible to authorized users. Using row-level 
encryption, instead, it is possible to make available to the authorized user the 
keys (or the key) that can be used to decrypt only the allowed rows. This 
technique, besides ensuring a better management of access permissions, 
                                                 
1 4  http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/database/options/advanced-
security/index-099011.html 
1 5  http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb934049.aspx 
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prevents any kind of statistical analysis on the table, since every relation 
between similar rows is nullified by the different key encryption. In a standard 
RDBMS, however, this technique has significant disadvantages in terms of 
performance and functionality: querying would be possible only through the 
construction of appropriate indexes for each column of the table (with a 
considerable waste of resources both in terms of time and space), while 
foreign keys would be unusable, since the different key encryption breaks 
every relation between equal values. Another major issue concerns the 
management of keys: row-level encryption needs generation and distribution 
of a key for each row of each table encrypted with this method. To solve (or 
alleviate) this problem, some key management techniques can be used, such 
as: 
 Broadcast (or Group) encryption [13]: rows are divided into 
equivalence classes, based on recipients. Every class is encrypted using 
an asymmetric algorithm where the encryption key is made in a way 
that each recipient can decrypt the information using only its own 
private key. Both the public and the private keys are generated by a 
trusted entity. 
 Identity Based Encryption [11]: it bounds the encryption key to the 
identity of recipient. Each recipient generates by itself a key pair used 
to encrypt/decrypt information. 
 Attribute Based Encryption [12]: it bounds the encryption key to an 
attribute (a group) of recipient. Each recipient receives by a trusted 
entity the private key used to decrypt, while the encryption key is 
calculated by the sender. 
However these techniques are complex and therefore, to the best of my 
knowledge, no research prototype or commercial database encryption system 
adopt row encryption. 
3.5 Attacks to database security 
The database security may be compromised by an attacker that can be 
categorized into three classes [156]:  
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 Intruder - A person who gains access to a computer system and tries to 
extract valuable information.  
 Insider - A person who belongs to the group of trusted users and tries 
to get information beyond his own access rights.  
 Administrator - A person who has privileges to administer a computer 
system, but uses his administration rights in order to extract valuable 
information. 
The different types of attack can be classified in passive and active [136]. The 
first category contains the attacks that only read the data without altering it 
and includes [136]: 
 Static leakage: it is an attack that gains information on the database 
plaintext values by observing a snapshot of the database at a certain 
time. E.g., if the database is encrypted in a way that equal plaintext 
values are encrypted to equal ciphertext values, statistics about the 
plaintext values, such as their frequencies can easily be learned.  
 Linkage leakage: it is an attack that gains information on the database 
plaintext values by linking a table value to its position in the index. E.g., 
if the table value and the index value are encrypted the same way (both 
ciphertext values are equal), an observer can search the table cipher 
text value in the index, determine its position and estimate its plaintext 
value.  
 Dynamic leakage: it is an attack that gains information about the 
database plaintext values by observing and analyzing the changes 
performed in the database over a period of time. E.g., if a user monitors 
the index for a period of time, and if in this period of time only one 
value is inserted (no values are updated or deleted), the observer can 
estimate its plaintext value based on its position in the index. 
The second category contains the attacks that modify the database and 
includes [157]: 
 Spoofing: replacing a ciphertext value with a generated value. 
Assuming that the encryption keys are secure, a possible attacker might 
try to generate a valid ciphertext value, and substitute the current valid 
value stored on the disk. Assuming that the encryption keys were not 
compromised, this attack poses a relatively low risk.  
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 Splicing: replacing a ciphertext value with a different cipher text value. 
Under this attack, the encrypted content from a different location is 
copied to a new location under attack.  
 Replay: replacing a cipher text value with an old version previously 
updated or deleted.  
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4 IN-MEMORY DATABASES  
In this Chapter, I illustrate the characteristics of the In-Memory Databases, a proven 
mature technology that takes advantage of the current wide availability of main memory to 
reverse the usual storage strategy, storing the information directly into main memory and 
using the disk only for data backup.  
Magnetic disks are heavily used as primary storage in computer systems 
since their introduction in 1955 with the IBM 350 Disk File device, announced 
by IBM as a component of the IBM 305 RAMAC computer system on 
September 13, 1956 [66].  
Two of the most critical parameters for a magnetic disc are capacity and 
performance. Disc drive capacity refers to the size of storage memory available 
on a disc drive. Disc drive performance describes the speed and efficiency with 
which data can be written to and read from a drive1 6 . 
During these years, the capacity has rapidly grown from the initial 5 million 7-
bit (6-bits plus 1 odd parity bit) characters (about 4.4 megabytes) [67] to the 
actual multiple terabytes size. Instead, the performance has not grown at the 
same speed (see Figure 16 and Figure 17). 
                                                 
1 6  “Disc Drive Capacity and Performance”, Seagate Technical paper, 2001  
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Figure 16 Data sets growth1 7  
 
Figure 17 Disk performance improvements vs. capacity growth1 8  
With the aim to overcome this limitation, particularly heavy in the case of data 
centers and transactional systems, many people have proposed new 
approaches to disk based storage or, as a revolutionary choice, to store data in 
random access memory, using disk only as backup [63]. 
Since 1985, some precursor designed a “memory resident DBMS” [68] where 
data is resident in main memory, but, at that time, RAM capacity was very low 
to permit the storage of large datasets. 
During the last 20 years, the RAM capacity of computers has increased 
exponentially by a factor of 10 every 4 years, following Moore’s Law. The 
graph below illustrates the typical memory configuration installed on personal 
computers since 1980.  
                                                 
1 7 Source: http://wiki.r1soft.com 
1 8  Source: http://wiki.r1soft.com 
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Figure 18 The RAM modules capacity1 9  
At the same time, RAM’s price per byte is falling down quickly, so today there 
are the conditions to effectively use the, “main memory database system” 
(MMDB), also known as in-memory database (IMDB) or as real-time database 
(RTDB). 
“In-memory databases have recently become an intriguing topic for the 
database industry. With the mainstream availability of 64-bit servers with 
many gigabytes of memory a completely RAM based database solution is a 
tempting prospect to a much wider audience.”2 0  
It is important to remark that, while a conventional database system stores 
data on disk but caches it into memory for access, in an IMDB the data resides 
permanently in the main physical memory and there is a backup copy on disk 
[27].  
IMDBs are intended either for personal use (because they are comparatively 
small w.r.t. traditional databases), or for performance-critical systems (for 
their very low response time and very high throughput). They use main 
memory structures, so they need no translation from disk to memory form, 
and no caching and they perform better than traditional DBMSs with Solid 
State Disks.  
In Table 4, I summarize pros and cons for IMDBs. 
                                                 
1 9  Source: Intel 
2 0  http://www.remote-dba.net/t_in_memory_cohesion_ssd.htm 
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Table 4 IMDBs Pros and Cons 
Pros Cons 
Fast transactions 
No translation 
High reliability 
Multi-User Concurrency (few 
locks) 
Complexity of durability ’s 
implementation  
Size limited by main memory 
 
4.1 The impact of in-memory structure 
Main memory is a random-access, byte-addressable device while disk is 
semi-random, block-addressable device. These differences have an impact on 
different aspects of DBMS. 
4.1.1 Data representation 
To optimize space utilization, necessary to hold the active database 
entirely in main memory, compact data structures such as T-trees [70] or 
array structures [71] have been proposed to organize permanent data 
efficiently in main memory. In particular, the relation between two tuples may 
be represented using memory pointers instead of external keys [27] (see 
Figure 19). This permits a smaller storage and a faster access to related 
records. 
 
Figure 19 The usage of pointers in relations 
In conventional DBMS we need translation from stored representation (e.g. 
records in files) to applications’ form; while in IMDBs, since data is stored in 
main memory, we have a unique representation of it.  
4.1.2 Access methods 
While disk-oriented index structures, as B-Tree [72] and derived, are 
intended for block storage and then are designed to minimize the number of 
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disk accesses and the required disk space, main memory index structures are 
designed to reduce overall computation time while using as little memory as 
possible. Since data is in main memory, instead to use associative values <key, 
position> to relate keys to tuples, we can use memory pointers to actual 
attribute values, which remain in their place, giving some clear advantages 
[73]: 
 A single tuple pointer provides the index with access to both the 
attribute value of a tuple and the tuple itself, reducing the size of the 
index;  
 This eliminates the complexity of dealing with long fields, variable 
length fields, and compression techniques in the index, 
 Moving pointers will tend to be cheaper than moving the (usually 
longer) attribute values when updates necessitate index operations, and 
 Since a single tuple pointer provides access to any field in the tuple, 
multi-attribute indices will need less in the way of special mechanisms. 
There are two main types of index structures: those that preserve some 
natural ordering in the data and those that randomize the data. The index 
structures being studied here are (see Figure 20 and Figure 21): arrays, AVL-
Trees, B-Trees, and T -Trees, for the order-preserving class; and Chained 
Bucket Hashing, Linear Hashing and Extendible Hashing, for the randomizing 
class. 
 Arrays [71] use minimal space, providing that the size is known in 
advance or that growth is not a problem, but the computational 
complexity of data movement is O(N)2 1  for each update, so it useful just 
in read-only environment; 
 AVL-Trees [74] use a binary tree search. Updates always affect a leaf 
node and may result in an unbalanced tree, so the tree is kept balanced 
by rotation operations. The disadvantage in AVL-Trees is their poor 
storage utilization, since each tree node holds only one data item, so 
there are two pointers and some control information for every data 
item.  
                                                 
2 1 N is the number of elements of the array  
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 B-Trees [75] are a usual structure for disk indexes, since they are broad 
shallow trees and require few node accesses to retrieve a value. Most 
database systems use a variant of the B-Tree, the B+-Tree, which keeps 
all of the actual data in the leaves of the tree, but in main memory this 
does not speed up the search, while it wastes space. In B-Trees: 
o Storage utilization is good since the pointer to data ratio is small, 
as leaf nodes hold only data items and they comprise a large 
percentage of the tree);  
o Searching is reasonably quick since a small number of nodes are 
searched with a binary search; and  
o Updating is fast since data movement usually involves only one 
node. 
 
Figure 20 Tree structures, source [70] 
 Chained Bucket Hashing [77] is a very fast static structure used both in 
memory and on disk. Since it is static, it never has to reorganize its data 
(advantage), but, for the same reason, it may have very poor behaviour 
in a dynamic environment (disadvantage) because the size of the hash 
table must be estimated before the table is filled. A wrong estimated 
size may affect the performance (too small), or the wasted space (too 
large).  
 Extendible Hashing [78] employs a dynamic hash table. With respect to 
the previous structure, the table size does not need to be known in 
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advance since a hash node contains several items and splits into two 
nodes when an overflow occurs. The directory grows in powers of two, 
doubling whenever a node overloads and has reached the maximum 
depth for a particular directory size. Since any node can cause the 
directory to split, the directory can become very large if the hash 
function is not sufficiently random.  
 Linear Hashing [79] uses a dynamic hash table that grows linearly as it 
splits nodes in predefined linear order. First, the buckets can be 
ordered sequentially, allowing the bucket address to be calculated from 
a base address - no directory is needed. Second, the event that triggers 
a node split can be based on storage utilization, keeping the storage 
cost constant for a given number of elements.  
 Modified Linear Hashing [79] is a variant of the previous structure that 
uses a directory much like Extendible Hashing, except that it grows 
linearly, and chained single-item nodes, allocated from a general 
memory pool. The splitting criteria are based on performance, i.e. the 
average length of the hash chains, rather than storage utilization. 
Monitoring average hash chain length provides more direct control 
over the average search and update times than monitoring storage 
utilization.  
 T-Trees [70] are binary trees, evolved from AVL-Trees and B-Trees, 
with many elements in a node. They retain the intrinsic binary search 
nature of the AVL-Tree united to the good update and storage 
characteristics of the B-Tree. Data movement is required for insertion 
and deletion, but it is usually needed only within a single node. 
Rebalancing is done using rotations similar to those of the AVL-Tree, 
but it is done much less often than in an AVL-Tree due to the possibility 
of intra-node data movement. 
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Figure 21 Hash structures, source: [70] 
4.1.3 Query processing 
The use of a random access memory to maintain data has a deep impact on 
common operations. First of all, we have no advantage in sequential data 
access, so data contiguity loses value. Operations as sorting become useless 
because it is more valuable using pointers to create sorted list instead of 
moving data.  
While data may still be represented by the relational model, the use of 
pointers to express relations naturally brings to a semantic model. The 
relations are surfing following pointers and joins exploit this possibility, 
instead of using external keys [27]. 
The goal is not minimizing the disk accesses, but the processing cost in main 
memory. This depends on the architecture, and then the optimization 
techniques need to be evaluated in the running system. 
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4.1.4 Concurrency control 
Concurrency is defined as the ability of multiple processes and threads to 
access and change the data records at the same time. The lower the contention 
to access and modify data with more users, the better the concurrency, and 
vice versa.  
Database concurrency controls ensure that transactions occur in an ordered 
fashion to protect transactions issued by different users/applications from the 
effects of each other. They must preserve the four characteristics of database 
transactions: atomicity, isolation, consistency and durability , also known as 
ACID. 
Two approaches can be adopted to manage concurrent data access: 
pessimistic and optimistic [80]. Pessimistic concurrency systems assume that 
conflict will occur and it avoids conflicts by acquiring locks on data that is 
being read or modified, so that no other process can modify that data. 
Optimistic concurrency systems assume that transactions are unlikely to 
modify data that another transaction is modifying. This is implemented by 
using versioning technique. This allows readers to see the state of the data 
before the modification occurs as the system maintains previous version of the 
data record before it actually attempts to change it. Usually DBMSs use 
pessimistic approach, while versioned file systems use optimistic approach. 
4.1.4.1 Granularity of locks in a database with 
pessimistic approach 
The granularity of locks in a RDBMS refers to how much of the data is 
locked at one time. In theory, a database server can lock as much as the entire 
database or as little as one column of data. Such extremes affect the 
concurrency (number of users that can access the data) and locking overhead 
(amount of work to process lock requests) in the server.  
Granularity levels are listed below ordered from large to fine granularity [81]: 
Database, Table,  Disk Block or Memory Page,  Record, and Record Field. 
Since the best granularity size depends on the given transaction, DBMS should 
support multiple level so granularity and allows the transaction to pick any 
level it wants. 
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By locking at higher levels of granularity, the amount of work required to 
obtain and manage locks is reduced. If a query needs to read or update many 
rows in a table: 
 It can acquire just one table-level lock 
 It can acquire a lock for each page that contained one of the required 
rows 
 It can acquire a lock on each row 
Less overall work is required to use a table-level lock, but large-scale locks can 
degrade performance, by making other users wait until locks are released. 
Decreasing the lock size makes more of the data accessible to other users. 
However, finer granularity locks can also degrade performance, since more 
work is necessary to maintain and coordinate the increased number of locks. 
To achieve optimum performance, a locking scheme must balance the needs of 
concurrency and overhead. 
In an IMDB, small locking granules are inappropriate, since contention is 
already low because data is memory resident. Usually IMDBs prefer to use 
very large lock granules (e.g. table or database) [82]. 
4.1.5 Logging and Recovery 
Normally, the use of volatile memory-based IMDBs supports the three 
ACID properties [83] of atomicity, consistency and isolation, but lacks support 
for the durability property. To add the latter, when non-volatile random access 
memory (NVRAM) is not available, IMDBs use a combination of transaction 
logging and primary database check-pointing to the system's hard disk: they 
log changes from committed transactions to physical medium and, 
periodically, update a disk image of the database. Having to write updates to 
disk, the write operations are heavier than read-only [27] and impact on 
system performance. Logging policies vary from product to product: some 
leave the choice of when to write the application on file, others do all the 
checkpoints at regular intervals of time or after a certain amount of data 
entered / edited. 
Following are some of the desirable properties of logging and recovery 
algorithms [85]: Reduced log traffic, Speedy logging and recovery, Transaction 
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priority oriented logging and recovery, and Data class oriented logging and 
recovery. 
4.1.5.1 Transaction logging and commit 
processing 
A transaction is a sequence of operations, which may lead to a success or a 
failure. If successful, the result of the operations must be permanent; while in 
case of failure, it must return to its previous state when the transaction [84].  
In an IMDB, transactions need to be stored in a permanent storage until they 
are committed and the final result is written to the log. The transaction 
logging can be divided in REDO and UNDO tails [84]. 
To minimize the impact on performance, IMDBs can use some strategy, main 
of which are: 
 Log driven backups [86] : is composed of a stable memory and recovery 
task, which work in parallel. The stable memory [87] usually consists of 
a main conventional RAM, a Safe RAM which is called the Safe, and a 
conventional disk and stores the log tail that includes both UNDO and 
REDO logs produced by active transactions. Asynchronically, the 
recovery task move transaction from stable memory to the checkpoint 
log. 
 Pre-committing [73]: if the system has not a stable memory, it can do a 
pre-commit, releasing the transaction lock without waiting for the 
information to be written to log. The sequential nature of log ensures 
that transactions cannot commit before others on which they depend. 
This way the response time remains the same but the blocking delay of 
other concurrent transaction is reduced. 
 Group commit [73]: a set of updates are grouped together in one log 
write to amortize the cost of the log write disk I/O over several updates.  
 
4.1.6 Performance 
Thanks to the lower latency time, IMDBs usually have better performance 
then conventional DBMSs, especially in read operations. 
 64 
While in conventional DBMSs the performance is evaluated in terms of disk 
accesses, in IMDBs the metrics is different, e.g., it is related to measure of 
checkpointing/logging. The path to performance improvement may be 
summarized in: Index improvements [70], Parallel and distributed systems 
[89][64][11][92] , and Checkpointing improvement [90] [91]. 
The improvement of performance is particularly important when IMDBs are 
used in Real Time or Multiuser Systems, where they are a good choice for their 
small latency that allows fast responses to events/requests. But IMDB are 
often used in embedded application, where compactness is more valuable than 
performance. 
4.2 Cache vs. IMDB 
Disk cache is a cache or buffer used to hold portions of the disk address 
space contents to capture a significant fraction of the I/O operations. It can 
provide access times and transfer rates significantly better than disk, and can 
improve I/O system performance and thereby postpone or eliminate the 
predicted I/O system bottleneck [93]. 
In recent years there has been a surge in the use of DRAM, driven by the 
performance requirements of large-scale Web applications. For example, both 
Google and Yahoo! store their search indices entirely in DRAM [63]. 
Memcached2 2  provides a general-purpose key-value store entirely in DRAM, 
and it is widely used to offload back-end database systems (however, 
memcached makes no durability guarantees so it must be used as a cache). 
The Bigtable storage system allows entire column families to be loaded into 
memory, where they can be read without any disk accesses [11]. Big-table has 
also explored many of the issues in federating large numbers of storage 
servers. 
The cache is useful only if the page fault rate is low, otherwise the number of 
disk access is not significantly reduced. The 1000x gap in access time between 
DRAM and disk means that a cache must have exceptionally high hit rates to 
                                                 
2 2  http://memcached.org/ 
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avoid significant performance penalties: even a 1% miss ratio for a DRAM 
cache costs a factor of 10x in performance [87]. 
Modern application, e.g. Facebook, have a very limited locality 2 3 , due to 
complex linkages between data (e.g., friendships in Facebook). To obtain 
providing a hit rate of 96.5%, the total amount of memory used by the storage 
system in Facebook equals approximately 75% of the total size of the data 
(excluding images) [87]. Using an IMDB, the memory used is incremented of 
the last 25%, but obtains it guarantees performance independent of access 
patterns or locality. 
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5 BROADCAST ENCRYPTION 
Originally born for signal broadcasting, Broadcast Encryption (BE) schemes are being used 
and adapted in the emerging field of Online Social Networks (OSN), were communities of 
users want to securely share data or messages. OSNs present many analogies with 
distributed databases where data is replicated at more than one node. When a data change 
happens at a node, the node has to propagate it to all copies of the same data resident at 
other nodes. In terms of the underlying network protocols, this implies a lot of messages. BE 
schemes can help to significantly reduce the amount of communications in the network, 
allowing the transmission of a common encrypted message that is understandable by all 
nodes involved. 
Broadcast Encryption (BE) is the cryptographic problem of encrypting 
broadcast content (e.g. TV programs) in such a way that only qualified users 
(e.g. subscribers who have paid their fees) can decrypt the content. 
More formally, “a broadcast encryption system allows a center to 
communicate securely over a broadcast channel with selected sets of users. 
Each time the set of privileged users changes, the center enacts a protocol to 
establish a new broadcast key that only the privileged users can obtain, and 
subsequent transmissions by the center are encrypted using the new broadcast 
key” [35].  The following figure shows an example schema: 
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Figure 22 Broadcast encryption 
A typical scenario is the transmission of broadcast TV show: the entity 
responsible for the spread (the International Broadcast Center) wants to send 
the program to the whole community of viewers. To this end, it is not 
necessary that the source emits a different signal for each user: a single 
transmission is sufficient, as each target device will then be able to capture the 
signal and properly receive the transmitted information.  
Generally BE schemes are classified into two types: symmetric key and public 
key based BE schemes [60]. In the symmetric key setting, the only trusted 
group center GC can generate a broadcast message to users while, in the 
public key setting, any users are allowed to broadcast a message. I denote by U 
the set of users and by R ⊂ U the set of revoked users. The following is a 
formal definition of a symmetric key based BE scheme [60]. 
A BE scheme B is a triple of polynomial-time algorithms (SetUp, BEnc, Dec), 
i.e., setup, broadcast encryption, and decryption [60]: 
SetUp: a randomized algorithm which takes as input a security parameter 1 λ  
and user set U. It generates private information SKEYu for user u ∈ U. Private 
information of group center GC is defined as the set SKEYu of private 
information of all users.  
BEnc: a randomized algorithm which takes as input a security parameter 1 λ , 
private information SKEYU of GC, a set R of revoked users, and a message M 
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to be broadcast. It first generates a session key GSK and outputs (HdrR, 
CGSK, M ) where a header Hdr is information for a privileged user to compute 
GSK and (CGSK, M) is a ciphertext of M encrypted under the symmetric key 
GSK. Broadcast message consists of [R, HdrR , CGSK,M ]. The pair (R, HdrR ) 
and CGSK,M are often called the full header and the body, respectively. 
Dec: a deterministic algorithm which takes as input a user index indu, private 
information SKEYu of u, the set of revoked users R, and a header HdrR. If 
u∈ U\R, it outputs the session key GSK.  
In public key broadcast encryption, the setup algorithm additionally generates 
the public keys PKU of users and PKU instead of the private information SKEYu 
of GC is taken as input in the algorithms BEnc and Dec. 
 
5.1 Broadcast Encryption schemas 
A first scheme involves an initialization phase, which a distinct secret key 
is assigned to each user of the system. To transmit a message M, the source 
concatenates as many copies of M as the number of receivers, by encoding 
each copy with a different secret key. The disadvantage of such scheme is that 
the resulting message has a size that depends on the numbers of intended 
receivers. Rather than a technique of broadcasting, this pattern can be seen as 
a way to unify multiple parallel communications between the International 
Broadcast Center and each of the authorized users [140]. 
An enhancement can be to encrypt the information using a (newly generated) 
session key SK and then to send the session key to the receivers using the 
previous scheme and transmitting the information. Each receiver decrypts the 
message using its own copy of SK. The advantage is that, usually, the length of 
the key is shorter than that of information [140]. 
Another scheme divides the users in groups. At each group is assigned a secret 
key. A user receives the secret keys of all the groups he belongs to. The user 
needs a size store that depends on the number of her affiliation. This scheme 
is unsuitable if the groups are dynamic, since it requires changing keys with 
the composition of the group [38] [140]. 
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5.2 Threshold cryptosystem 
The first real solution for BE were the threshold cryptosystems [38] 
[39].The (s, n)-threshold scheme (threshold scheme "s on n") permits to break 
up a secret information I among N participants, dividing I in N parts I1,. . . , In 
called shares. The shares are constructed so that the knowledge of S (or more) 
shares allows the reconstruction of I, while the knowledge of S-1 (or less) 
shares doesn’t determine any value or subset of values. 
A basic broadcast encryption scheme consists of these phases [37]: 
 Registration: to collect the authorized (identifier of) receivers  
 Key generation: a new group symmetric key  K is generated, based on 
the receivers information 
 Encryption: the information I is encrypted using K obtaining E 
 Decryption: the authorized receivers decrypt E  
A broadcast message M is composed of two parts: a header, which contains 
information that can be used to access the content, and the body, which 
contains the encrypted content. 
There are many schemes for BE, among others: 
 Stateful schemes 
o Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) [40] 
 Stateless schemes 
o Complete Subtree (CS) [41] 
o Subtree-Difference [42] 
o Layered Subtree-Difference [42] 
The original solution of Shamir is based on polynomial interpolation: since, 
given S points P1 =(x1 ,y1 )..Ps=(xs,ys) with distinct x i, there is one and only one 
polynomial of S-1 such that P(x i)=y i for all i=1..S, Shamir sets P(0)=I and 
broadcast S-1 point Pi.  Only the authorized receivers have an additional good 
point and can recreate the polynomial interpolation and calculate P(0). 
5.3 Distributed key generation 
If the secret key is released by a unique authority, it needs to be trusted. If 
this is not assured, it is better to use a distributed key generation, where every 
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party contributes to the assembly of the key. The following techniques address 
this issue. 
5.3.1 El Gamal 
ElGamal is a public key encryption system that is used in many other 
systems (as IBE and GCC) [141]. It is based on the hardness of computing the 
discrete logarithm. The three phases of ElGamal are: 
1. Key generation: each user generates a public key ) mod ,,( a aK  
where: 
a. ρ is a large prime number 
b. σ is a primitive radix of ρ 
c. a, the true secret key, is randomized in the interval [1.. ρ-2] 
2. Encryption: to send a message m ∈ Zp the user randomly chooses a 
number k in the interval [1.. ρ-2] . The ciphertext will be (y,Δ) where: 
a. y= σk mod ρ 
b. Δ=m* σa k mod ρ 
3. Decryption: the receiver obtain the encrypted message (y,Δ) and, using 
her secret key a, calculate  
4. Δy−a=m* σa k* (σk) –a  mod ρ = m mod ρ 
ElGamal has the disadvantage that the ciphertext is twice as long as the 
plaintext. It has the advantage the same plaintext gives a different ciphertext 
(with near certainty) each time it is encrypted. 
 
5.3.2 Identity Based Encryption (IBE) 
While IBE is not a BE system, it is fundamental to understand next BE 
systems as ABE and GCC. 
An Identity Base Encryption (IBE) scheme is a public-key cryptosystem 
where any string is a valid public key. In particular, email addresses and dates 
can be public keys [55]. IBE allows for a sender to encrypt a message to an 
identity without access to a public key certificate. The ability to do public key 
encryption without certificates has many practical applications. For example, 
a user can send an encrypted mail to a recipient, e.g. bobsmith@gmail.com, 
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without the requiring either the existence of a Public-Key Infrastructure or 
that the recipient be on-line at the time of creation.  
IBE was proposed by Adi Shamir in 1984 [55] but remained an open 
problem for many years, until the Boneh/Franklin's pairing-based encryption 
scheme2 4  [30][54] and the Cocks's encryption scheme [56] based on quadratic 
residues. 
Interesting characteristics of IBE are key expiration, management of user 
credentials (user can choose her PK), and delegation of decryption 
capabilities. 
An identity-based encryption scheme E is specified by four randomized 
algorithms: Setup, Extract, Encrypt, and Decrypt [54]. 
 Setup: takes a security parameter k and returns system parameters and 
master-key. The system parameters include a description of a finite 
message space M, and a description of a finite ciphertext space C. 
Intuitively, the system parameters will be publicly known, while the 
master-key will be known only to the “Private Key Generator" (PKG). 
 Extract: takes as input system parameters, master-key, and an 
arbitrary ID ∈ {0, 1}* and returns a private key d. Here ID is an 
arbitrary string that will be used as a public key, and d is the 
corresponding private decryption key. The Extract algorithm extracts a 
private key from the given public key. 
 Encrypt: takes as input system parameters, ID, and m ∈M. It returns a 
ciphertext c ∈C. 
 Decrypt: takes as input system parameters, c ∈ C, and a private key d. 
It returns m∈M. 
One common feature of all Identity-Based Encryption systems is that they 
view identities as a string of characters.  
Figure 23 shows an example of the flow of the IBE operations. 
                                                 
2 4  The cryptosystem has chosen ciphertext security in the random oracle 
model assuming an elliptic curve variant of the computational Diffie-Hellman 
problem 
 73 
 
Figure 23 The IBE operations 
5.4 Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) 
As introduced in [44], ABE is a Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption. In Fuzzy 
IBE an identity is view as set of descriptive attributes. Each community 
member receives a private key depending on its attributes (i.e., the subgroup 
to which it belongs), as showed in Figure 24. Information can be decrypted by 
people that have a certain attribute. For example, a user can have attributes 
such as employee and family and therefore is able to decode either the 
messages sent to collaborators either to relatives.  
More formally, “a Fuzzy IBE scheme allows for a private key for an identity, ω, 
to decrypt a ciphertext encrypted with an identity, ω’ , if and only if the 
identities ω and ω’ are close to each other as measured by the set overlap 
distance metric” . 
Known variants of ABE are [45]: 
 Secure Attribute Based Systems [52] 
 Multi-authority Attribute Based Encryption [47] 
 Key-policy Attribute-based Encryption [43] 
 Cipher-policy Attribute-based Encryption [46] 
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 Provable Secure Ciphertext Policy ABE [48] 
 Attribute Based Encryption with Non-Monotonic Access Structures [51] 
 Predicate Encryption Supporting Disjunctions, Polynomial Equations 
and Inner Products [49] 
 Attribute Based Ring Signatures [50] 
Common to these ABE schemes is the existence of a central trusted authority 
(master) that knows a secret master key and distributes secret attribute keys 
to eligible users. In [53] was presented Distributed Attribute-Based 
Encryption (DABE) to allow an arbitrary number of authorities to 
independently maintain attributes. Even if this scheme is not bound to a 
central server, it does not use a peer mechanism.  
 
Figure 24 An ABE sample 
5.5 Encryption in Online Social Network 
The widespread success of Online Social Network (OSN) has led to a wide 
availability of personal data, which are often crawled by other users or OSN 
itself to target their users. Traditional cryptographic schemes are not adequate 
to protect data from abuse but, at the same time, permit authorized user the 
access to it. The use of public key cryptography forces users to store many 
copies of encrypted data and to know the identities of every community 
member since it doesn’t allow communications based on groups (attributes). 
To solve this problem, new encryption schemes were studied, specifically 
designed for use in an OSN [143] [144]. Here I focus on Persona and GCC, 
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which can be evaluated to adopt similar strategies in the development of my 
system. 
5.5.1 Persona 
Persona [61] is a private OSN that encrypts user data with attribute-based 
encryption (ABE), allowing users to apply fine-grained policies over users who 
may view their data. This architecture achieves privacy by encrypting private 
contents and prevents misuse of a user’s applications through authentication 
based on traditional public key cryptography (PKC). 
Persona divides the OSN entities into two categories: users, who generate the 
content in the OSN, and applications, which provide services to users and 
manipulate the OSN content. 
In Persona, all users store their data encrypted for groups that they define. 
Any user that can name a piece of data may retrieve it, but they can only read 
it if they belong to the group for which the data was encrypted.  
Persona operations are intended to manage group (defined using ABE) 
members and access to resources. The areas covered by Persona are: 
 Group management with the capability to: 
o Add individuals to a group. The user generates an appropriate 
attribute secret key, encrypts this key using the target user's 
public key, and stores the encrypted key on her storage service. 
The target user can retrieve this encrypted key, decrypt it, and 
use it as necessary 
o Define groups based on a group defined by another user 
o Provide other users specific rights to named resources. An 
example of such a right would be the ability to store data on 
another user's storage service 
o Remove a group member. It requires re-keying: all remaining 
group members must be given a new key. Data encrypted with 
the old key remains visible to the revoked member. 
 Publishing and Retrieving Data: private user data in Persona is always 
encrypted with a symmetric key. The symmetric key is encrypted with 
an ABE key corresponding to the group that is allowed to read this data. 
This two phase encryption allows data to be encrypted to groups; reuse 
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of the symmetric key allows Persona to minimize expensive ABE 
operations. 
5.5.2 Group-oriented Convergence Cryptosystem 
(GCC) 
The previous schemes, based on traditional cryptographic techniques have 
limitations when dealing with multiple groups in Online Social Networks, 
since either users must store multiple copies of encrypted data but are unable 
to give data based on membership in multiple groups, or users must know the 
identities of everyone to whom they give access.  
In [57] was introduced a community key management method based on a 
group-oriented convergence cryptosystem (GCC). This method leverages the 
following properties: the community is built on convergence of some users’ 
private keys, the upload and download of resources provide the authentication 
and integrity checking, as well as there exist efficient mechanisms for access 
permission delegation and sophisticated revocation. 
In this environment, the users in social networks are divided into four 
categories: 
 Kernel members (KM): can create and manage a special community by 
collaboration and have rights to publish, delete, access or update 
resources released by other members of the community;  
 Full authorized members (FAM): have full rights to publish and access 
resources in the community, but do not have permissions to delete or 
update resources; 
 Authorized members (AM): can access the resources by using her own 
access permission, but cannot publish these resources; 
 Unauthorized users (UU): may not have permissions to access 
resources published by community members. 
GCC is specified by these algorithms: 
 UserRegister: each user can choose a favourite label, generate a private 
key by herself, and then register her label into the system 
 BuildCommunity: when somebody wants to share resources with 
others, she constructs a community together with a set of trusted 
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friends. Finally, each member gets a community key, which can be used 
to access, manage and maintain the resources in this community; 
 DelegatePermission: when a user wishes to access a community, her 
friends hold the community key can delegate an access per-mission key 
(APK) to her by using this algorithm; 
 UploadResource: if one community member wants to post message and 
resource into the community, she picks the community key, invokes 
this algorithm to encrypt the resource with her private key, and then 
transmits the encrypted data to the storage server;  
 Download-Resource: anytime one community member can obtain the 
encrypted data from the server, and invoke this algorithm to retrieve 
the original post or re-source by her private key and APK. 
GCC can be seen as an extension of IBE and ABE: 
 As IBE, each user chooses its own keys, but without going through a 
centralized server 
 as ABE, allows the encryption of group but the group key is generated 
from public keys of the subjects of communication and does not require 
a trusted server 
Moreover, it allows the revocation and delegation. 
It is interesting that each user has a single private key; the system has as many 
public keys as community, but the public keys are used only to create the 
group key (after this moment, the users decrypt using their secret key). 
 78 
Table 5 Comparison between Persona and GCC 
 
5.6 Similarities between Distributed Databases 
and Online Social Network 
Although, at first glance, the concepts of database and OSN seem totally 
different, I want to investigate their similarities in the field of privacy.  
First, it is clear that the OSN has an internal database (see Figure 25) to store 
the information that dynamically will compose the wall (a space on every 
user's profile page that allows friends to post messages for the user to see 
[160]) of the users. The problem of protecting posts hosted in the OSN is then 
equivalent to protect shared data in an untrusted environment.  
 
Figure 25 The OSN internal storage 
Then, look at the topologies of OSN; traditionally it is represented as a mesh 
network among users [145], often leaving out the central node on the Cloud 
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(the OSN provider). Considering this central element, instead, the resulting 
topology is a star, as depicted in Figure 26: 
 
Figure 26 Topology of an OSN, as a mesh and as a star 
The same topology is shown in Figure 31, where a Distributed Database 
Architecture (DDA) is shown. In the latter, at the center of the star is the 
Synchronizer, which hosts a database. Either the OSN or the Synchronizer is 
untrusted entity that may not access data content, while the network clients 
may access information accordingly to the access policy.  
As every user leaves a post that may be read by multiple users (based on their 
permissions), but not from the server itself, so in the DDA, a user can send 
information to the Central Synchronizer to synchronize the replicated copies 
ensuring privacy in the central node. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the encryption techniques used in 
the OSN can be adapted for distributed databases. This topic will be addressed 
in Section 13. 
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6 PRIVACY WITHIN THE CLOUD  
In this Chapter, I analyse Cloud storage in the wider context of Cloud computing, which is a 
model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable 
computing resources that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal 
management effort or service provider interaction.  In this model there are more privacy 
issues than in Cloud Storage alone, the main of them I identify in server-side presentation 
layer and semantic model databases.  
Cloud computing includes a plethora of services, usually called XaaS (that 
stays for “everything-as-a-service”). The most common Cloud computing 
service models (i.e., from top to bottom, Software as a Service - SaaS, Platform 
as a Service - PaaS and Infrastructure as a Service - IaaS) are known as SPI.  
An architectural categorization of Cloud technologies as a stack of service 
types was proposed in [96] (see Figure 27). 
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Figure 27 Cloud stack, source: [96] 
The lowest level of the stack is IaaS, where a service provider offers 
computing, storage or networking infrastructure to customers. It contains two 
sublevels: Resource Set and Infrastructure Services. 
 Resource Set may be divided in Physical Resource Set (PRS), which is 
hardware dependent and therefore tied to a hardware vendor, and 
Virtual Resource Set (VRS), which can be built on vendor independent 
hypervisor technology. Examples of PRS services include Emulab [99] 
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and iLO [100]. VRS services include Amazon EC22 5 , Eucalyptus [101], 
Tycoon [98], Nimbus [103], and Open Nebula [104]. 
 Infrastructure Services include Basic Infrastructure Services (BIS), 
which combine computational, storage, and network services, and 
Higher Infrastructure Services (HIS), as Amazon’s Dynamo [102], and 
Google’s Bigtable [11]. 
The second level is PaaS, which contains the provider's resources to run 
custom applications. It groups Programming Environments, such as Sun (now 
Oracle) Project Caroline2 6  and the Django framework2 7 , and Execution 
Environments, such as Google App Engine2 8 , Joyent Reasonably Smart2 9  and 
Microsoft Azure3 0. Each provider can couple a development and an execution 
environment to expose its services.  
The third level is SaaS, where customers use software that is run on the 
provider’s infrastructure. The application developers can either use the PaaS 
layer to develop and run their applications or directly use the IaaS 
infrastructure. Additionally, SaaS can also be hosted in a "conventional" way, 
i.e. without underlying PaaS or IaaS. SaaS may be articulated in Basic 
Application Services, such as OpenId3 1  [105] and Google Maps3 2  services, and 
Composite Application Services, as My Space3 3  or Facebook3 4 . A superset of 
                                                 
2 5  Akamai Technologies Inc., “Akamai edgecomputing. Enabling applications 
that grow your business.” - http://www.akamai.com/dl/whitepapers/ 
Akamai_Enabling_Apps_Grow_Business_ 
2 6  http://labs.oracle.com/projects/caroline/ 
2 7  https://www.djangoproject.com/ 
2 8  http://code.google.com/intl/it-IT/appengine/ 
2 9  http://www.joyent.com/ 
3 0  http://www.microsoft.com/windowsazure/ 
3 1  http://openid.net/ 
3 2  http://maps.google.it/ 
3 3  http://it.myspace.com/ 
3 4  http://www.facebook.com/ 
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the previous service is the “Application Services” tout-court, such as Google 
Docs3 5 , Microsoft’s Office Live3 6  or Auciti Hangout3 7 . 
On top of the traditional SPI scheme, the new level HuaaS has appeared. It 
indicates a set of Cloud services that are processed by a community that 
provides, filters, and catalogs information, such as YouTube3 8 , Amazon 
Mechanical Turk3 9  or Digg4 0. 
In particular, in the realm of IaaS there are a lot of specialized services, 
including storage services. Storage services may be classified as Basic 
Infrastructure Services (BIS), when they only provide basic storage 
functionality (Amazon S34 1 , GoGrid Cloud Storage4 2 , ExpanDrive4 3 , Nirvanix 
Cloud Storage Network4 4 , Rackspace Cloud Files4 5 , etc.), or as Higher 
Infrastructure Services (HIS) when they provide additional functionality, like 
a query language. In this taxonomy, Database-as-a-Service (DBaaS) offerings 
like Amazon SimpleDB4 6  and technologies, such Google Bigtable [11], 10gen 
MongoDB4 7  and Apache HBase4 8  are categorized as HIS.  
DBaaS is a managed service, offered on a pay-per-usage basis, which provides 
on-demand access to a database for the storage of application data [95]. In the 
Cloud, storage is spanned on multiple servers, usually hosted in large data 
centres, whose operators manage the infrastructure.  
                                                 
3 5  http://docs.google.com/ 
3 6  http://www.officelive.com/ 
3 7  http://fun.auciti.com/ 
3 8  http://www.youtube.com/ 
3 9  https://www.mturk.com/ 
4 0  http://digg.com/ 
4 1  http://aws.amazon.com/s3/ 
4 2  http://www.gogrid.com/Cloud-hosting/Cloud-storage.php 
4 3  http://www.expandrive.com/ 
4 4  http://www.nirvanix.com/products-services/storage-delivery-network 
4 5  http://www.rackspace.com/Cloud/Cloud_hosting_products/files/ 
4 6  http://aws.amazon.com/simpledb/ 
4 7  http://www.10gen.com/ 
4 8  http://hbase.apache.org/ 
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6.1.1 Cryptographic Storage Service 
The benefits of using a public Cloud infrastructure are cost reduction, 
availability (anywhere access), and reliability (backups), but it introduces 
significant security and privacy risks for the confidentiality and integrity of 
data. To address these concerns a common solution is the use of cryptographic 
storage, which protects data using encryption to provide [97]: 
 Confidentiality: the Cloud storage provider does not learn any 
information about customer, and 
 Data integrity: any unauthorized modification of customer data by the 
Cloud storage provider can be detected by the customer; 
without giving up to the main benefits of a public storage service: 
 Availability: customer data is accessible from any machine and at all 
times, 
 Reliability: customer data is reliably backed up, 
 Efficient retrieval: data retrieval times are comparable to a public Cloud 
storage service, and 
 Data sharing: customers can share their data with trusted parties. 
The benefits of a CSS can be summarized in: 
 Regulatory compliance: often, law makes organizations responsible for 
the protection of the data that is entrusted to them. Since, in CSS, data 
is stored encrypted, customers can be assured that the confidentiality of 
their data is preserved irrespective of the actions of the Cloud storage 
provider; 
 Geographic restrictions: data may be subject to law of Country of 
physical storing. If data is stored on Cloud, it is not clear its physical 
location. Since, in CSS, data is stored encrypted, any law that pertains 
to the stored data has little to no effect on the customer; 
 Subpoenas: in case of a legal action, the request of data may be made to 
the Cloud provider and the latter could even be prevented from 
notifying the customer. Since, in CSS, data is stored encrypted, the 
Cloud provider has no access to information and needs to turn request 
to the customer. Moreover, the request is managed by the customer 
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under investigation and does not affect the others that store data on the 
Cloud provider; 
 Security breaches: a Cloud storage provider may be legally responsible 
for a security breach. But, in a CSS data is encrypted and data integrity 
can be verified at any time; 
 Electronic discovery: a Cloud provider needs a large amount of 
additional information to prove data integrity. In a CSS, instead, data 
integrity can be verified at any time without additional storing; and 
 Data retention and destruction: in the Cloud it is difficult to prove the 
destruction of previously collected data. In a CSS, even in case of data 
retention, information is not accessible to the provider. 
A cryptographic storage service (CSS) can have a Consumer Architecture or an 
Enterprise Architecture [97].  
6.1.1.1 A Consumer Architecture 
In a Consumer Architecture, three actors collaborate to share data: 
a. A user Alice that stores her data in the Cloud,  
b. A user Bob with whom Alice wants to share data, and  
c. A Cloud storage provider that stores Alice's data. 
The two users run locally a client application that consists of a data processor, 
a data verifier, and a token generator. At the first step, Alice's application 
generates a cryptographic key that is stored locally on Alice's system and that 
it is kept secret from the Cloud storage provider. 
Alice can: 
 Upload data to the Cloud using the data processor. It attaches some 
metadata (e.g., current time, size, keywords etc) and encrypts and 
encodes the data and metadata with a variety of cryptographic 
primitives. The result is sent to the Cloud storage; 
 Verify the integrity of her data using the data verifier. It uses Alice's 
master key to interact with the Cloud storage provider and ascertain the 
integrity of the data; 
 Retrieve data using keywords. The token generator is invoked to create 
a token. The token is sent to the Cloud storage provider who uses it to 
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retrieve the appropriate (encrypted) information which it returns to 
Alice. Alice then uses the decryption key to decrypt the information. 
To share data with Bob: (1) Alice's data processor prepares the data before 
sending it to the Cloud; (2) Bob asks Alice for permission to search for a 
keyword; (3) Alice invokes the token generator to create an appropriate token, 
and the credential generator to generate a credential for Bob, and sends them 
to Bob; (4) Bob sends the token to the Cloud; (5) the Cloud uses the token to 
find the appropriate encrypted documents and returns them to Bob. (6) At any 
point in time, Alice's data verifier can verify the integrity of the data. 
The process is summarized in the following schema: 
 
Figure 28 A Consumer Architecture 
6.1.1.2 An Enterprise Architecture 
In an Enterprise Architecture, three actors collaborate to share data: 
a. An enterprise MegaCorp that stores its data in the Cloud while 
using dedicated machines within its network to run a data 
processor (DP), a data verifier (DV), and a token generator (TG);  
b. A business partner PartnerCorp with whom MegaCorp wants to 
share data; and  
c. A Cloud storage provider that stores MegaCorp's data. 
The process is as follows: (1) each MegaCorp and PartnerCorp employee 
receives a credential that reflects her organization / team / role; (2) MegaCorp 
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employees send their data, together with an associated decryption policy that 
specifies the type of credentials necessary to decrypt it, to the internal 
machine hosting the DP; (3) the latter processes the data using the DP before 
sending it to the Cloud; (4) the PartnerCorp employee sends a keyword to 
MegaCorp's internal machine hosting TG; (5) the dedicated machine returns a 
token; (6) the PartnerCorp employee sends the token to the Cloud; (7) the 
Cloud uses the token to find the appropriate encrypted documents and returns 
them to the employee. (8) At any point in time, MegaCorp's DV can verify the 
integrity of MegaCorp's data. 
The process is summarized in the following schema: 
 
Figure 29 An Enterprise Architecture 
 
6.2 Privacy issues in Cloud computing 
The CSS assumes the distinction between data storage (on the Cloud) and data 
manipulation (in the client or corporation side), while Web 2.0 applications 
are usually hosted by PaaS providers. The most diffused Execution 
Environments on the Cloud handle both data and application management.  
The three main suppliers of Public Cloud Infrastructure (Google App Engine 
for Business, Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud and Windows Azure Platform) 
all include a datastore, and an environment for remote execution summarized 
in Table 6and Table 7. 
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Table 6 Datastore solutions used by public Clouds 
Provider Datastore 
Google  Bigtable  
Amazon  IBM DB2  
IBM Informix Dynamic Server  
Microsoft SQLServer Standard 2005  
MySQL Enterprise  
Oracle Database 11g  
Others installed by users 
Microsoft  Microsoft SQL Azure  
Table 7 Execution environments used by public Clouds 
Provider Execution environment 
Google  J2EE (Tomcat + GWT)  
Python  
Amazon  J2EE (IBM WAS, Oracle WebLogic Server) and others installed by users 
Microsoft  .Net  
 
Let us now go back to the scenario from where this dissertation has started: 
the possibility of an untrustworthy cloud supplier who can intercept 
communications, modify executable software components (e.g., using aspect 
programming), monitor the user application memory, etc. Figure 30describes 
a typical session, where data travels from data storage (DS) to the final user by 
passing through database drivers (e.g. JDBC/ODBC drivers), Object-
Relational Mapping (ORM) layer, until it arrives to the Presentation Layer 
(PL). While, as showed before, DS may be managed in a secure manner, the 
same can not be said about the other layers. The central line in Figure 30 (the 
wall) divides the part in charge of the Cloud and that in charge of User. 
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Figure 30 The wall 
Hence, available techniques for safely outsourcing data to untrusted DBMS no 
longer guarantee the confidentiality of data outsourced to the Cloud.  
The essential point consists in having the data and the user interface 
application logic on the same side of the wall. This is a major difference w.r.t. 
outsourced database scenarios, where presentation was handled by trusted 
clients. In the end, the data must be presented to the user in an intelligible and 
clear form; that is the moment when a malicious agent operating in the Cloud 
has more opportunities to intercept the data. To prevent unwanted access to 
the data at presentation time, it would be appropriate moving the presentation 
logics off the Cloud to a trusted environment that may be an intranet or, at the 
bottom level, a personal computer. 
However, separating data (which would stay in the Cloud) from the 
presentation logics may enable the creation of local copies of data, and lead to 
an inefficient cooperation between the two parts.  
6.3 Semantic datastore  
In Section 2.2-Data protection techniques, I showed many techniques for data 
outsourcing in untrusted servers, primarily designed for untrusted RDBMS. 
 92 
But since, today, Cloud computing approaches largely rely on semantic (non-
relational) DBMSs, those techniques cannot be applied directly. Semantic 
DBMSs do not store data in tabular format, but following the natural structure 
of objects. After more than twenty years of experimentation (see, for instance, 
[10] for the Galileo system developed at the University of Pisa), today, the 
lower performance of these systems is no longer a problem. In the field of 
Cloud computing, there is a particular attention to Google Bigtable.  
"Bigtable is a distributed storage system for managing structured data that is 
designed to scale to a very large size: petabytes of data across thousands of 
commodity servers. In many ways, Bigtable resembles a database: it shares 
many implementation strategies with databases." [11] 
With a semantic datastore like Bigtable, there is a more strict integration 
between in-memory data and stored-data; they are almost indistinguishable 
from the programmer viewpoint. There are not distinct phases when the 
program loads data from disk into main memory or, in the opposite direction, 
when program serialize data on disk. Applications do not even know where the 
data is stored, as it is scattered over the Cloud.  
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Part II - Research questions and 
results 
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7 DESIGN OF A DISTRIBUTED SYSTEM 
FOR INFORMATION SHARING  
This chapter presents the challenges that arise from the context described by the previous 
chapters in Part I of the thesis. My research contribution is the design of a new architecture 
whose goals are data privacy preservation, fine grained access control, and grant-and-
revoke capability. 
From the context described in the previous chapters, three main 
challenges emerge and are addressed by the architecture proposed in this 
thesis: 
 Native Cloud sharing system: in Section 6-Privacy within the Cloud, I 
exposed the peculiarity of Cloud storage considered not as a singleton 
but in the more general perspective of Cloud Computing. It brings to 
state that what presented in Section 2-Background on data protection is 
not perfectly suitable on the Cloud. My research contribution will 
consist in the design of a data sharing system thought for the Cloud 
since birth. 
 Safe system with minimal number of trusted components: to prevent 
privacy leaks in the remote storage, the usual strategies, shown in 
Section 2-Background on data protection, are: i) introducing some 
trusted component during data sharing, or ii) dividing information and 
responsibilities among different untrusted actors. In my research, 
instead, I want to guarantee privacy in an untrusted environment 
where only the data owner is trusted. 
 Platform independent system, built on available standard technologies: 
custom tools were developed for privacy in a well-defined platform (e.g. 
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the schemes for OSN in 5.5-Encryption in Online Social Network). My 
contribution is a framework that is independent from the Cloud 
provider, and uses standard industrial technologies and protocols. 
7.1 Description Language 
I will describe my approach to Cloud data privacy by means of the well-
known Unified Modeling Language (UML). I chose UML, rather than a more 
formal description, i.e., Finite-State Automata (FSA), to emphasize the 
collaboration among the distributed components and their role data exchange.  
UML4 9  is a standardized, general-purpose modeling language for object-
oriented software engineering, which implements the concepts of Model 
Driven Development (MDD) [158], a framework that arose, in the early 
1990’s, in the telecommunications industry. Although UML is a semiformal 
language that lacks a well-defined semantics and then hardly allows formal 
verification, it is widely used in communication protocols design and 
description (e.g. Broadcast Encryption Protocols, see Section 5).  
The strength of MDD is in modelling highly-concurrent processes that are 
state-based and communicate through well-defined messages [159]. It does so 
by a broad range of diagrams that covers requirements analysis (called use 
case diagrams), class components (class diagrams), algorithmic sequences 
(sequence diagrams), component evolutions (state diagrams), etc. The ability 
to extract sequence diagrams from UML executable models will allow us to 
verify and validate the system behaviour, as I will detail in Section 10. 
7.2 The architecture 
I build over the notion introduced in [7] of defining a view for every user 
group/role, but I prevent performance degradation by keeping all data views 
in the user environment.  
                                                 
4 9  http://www.omg.org/spec/UML/2.0/ 
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 Specifically, I atomize the application/database pair, providing a copy per 
user. Every instance runs locally, and maintains only authorized data that is 
replicated and synchronized among all authorized users.  
I will consider a system composed of:  
1. Local agents distributed at client side; 
2. A central synchronization point.  
The following figure shows the proposed architecture: 
 
Figure 31 The architecture 
7.3 The model  
Henceforth, I will use the term dossier to indicate a set of related 
information. My data model may be informally represented by the diagram in 
the following figure: 
  
Figure 32 The model  
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In my model, each node represents a local, single-user application/database 
dedicated to an individual user (un). Each node stores only the dossiers that its 
user may access. Shared dossiers (in this example, d1 ) are replicated on each 
node. When a node modifies a shared dossier, it must synchronize, also using 
heuristics and learning algorithms, with the other nodes that hold a copy of it. 
In Table 8 and Table 9, I give a simple SWOT analysis [162] of this idea. 
Table 8 Strength/Opportunities 
Information sharing using untrusted Synchronizer; 
Small amount of local data, less attractive for attackers; 
Only the final user has clear-text information; 
Unrestrained individual nodes, that can also work offline (with deferred synchronization);  
Simplicity of data management (single user);  
Completeness of local information.  
To clarify the last point, suppose that the user un  wants to know the number of 
the dossier she is treating. In a classic intranet approach, where dossiers 
reside on their owners' servers, in addition to its database,  un  should examine 
the data stores of all other collaborating users. With my approach, instead, I 
will simply perform a local query because the dossiers are replicated at each 
client. 
Table 9 Weaknesses/Threats 
Complexity of deferred synchronization schemes [21];  
Necessity to implement a mechanism for grant/revoke and access control permissions 
 
This last point is particularly important and it deserves further discussion: 
 Each user (except the data owner) may have partial access to a dossier. 
Therefore each node contains only the allowed portion of the 
information, i.e. the dossier does not contain at all the restricted parts; 
 Authorization, i.e., granting to a user uj access to a dossier dk, can be 
achieved by the data owner simply by transmitting to each node only 
the data it is allowed to access, i.e. the restricted attributes are omitted 
(blanked); 
 The inverse operation can be made in the case of a (partial or complete) 
revocation of access rights. An obvious difficulty lies in ensuring that 
data becomes no longer available to the revoked node. This is indeed a 
moot point, as it is impossible – whatever the approach - to prevent 
trusted users from creating local copies of data while they are 
authorized and continue using them after revocation. I am evaluating 
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the opportunity to use watermarking for relational databases [26] to 
provide copyright protection and tamper detection. 
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8 SCENARIOS 
In this Chapter, I define and discuss in depth some business scenarios where the proposed 
architecture naturally fits practical requirements. I will consider three typical scenarios: a 
medical, a group of independent professionals, and a nomadic user scenario, as they 
embody  very general and diffuse patterns of usage. 
As we will see, my approach best fit into a typical Business Collaborative 
Environment scenario, where a group of geographically scattered, associated 
professionals wants to share some structured information. Each actor can 
access only partial data of her interest. Data may be located at different sites. 
In the following, I will discuss three of these scenarios. 
8.1 Medical 
In this scenario, a family doctor shares some medical records with a 
specialist as a Radiologist or a Psychologist and the patients’ invoices with an 
Accountant. Clearly, a Radiologist may not access psychotherapy sessions, as 
well as a Psychologist may not access X-rays. Both of them need access to 
“Patient Master Data”, but only for their patients, a subset of those with the 
family doctor. After finishing the therapy, access to a patient data may even be 
revoked. The scenario is depicted in Figure 33. 
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Figure 33 A medical scenario 
Let us the following real life example: two Family Doctors FD1  and FD2 , two 
Radiologists R1  and R2 , a Psychologist P1 , an Accountant A1 , and three Patients 
Alice, Bob, and Charlie. Alice is with FD1 , R1 , and A1 , while Bob is with FD1 , R2 , 
and P1 , Charlie is with FD1 , and A1 . 
In my distributed system, this is modelled as in Figure 34. 
As we can see, each actor stores data locally in her computer; the Patient’s 
data is replicated in each of her doctors; each actor stores locally only the 
allowed portion of the patient’s data. 
 
Dossier
Invoices
Family 
Doctor
Radiologist 
Psychologist
Accountant
Patient
Master
Data
X-rays
Psychotherapy 
sessions
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Figure 34 An instance of medical scenario 
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8.2 Collaboration and sharing between 
independent professionals 
The previous scenario can be generalized to capture the case of 
professionals, such as Lawyers, Engineers, Business Consultants and so on. 
This scenario is challenging because each participant may be bound to 
confidentiality/non-disclosure obligations to her client; these obligations may 
overlap/conflict with each other. The common characteristics of these figures 
are strong data locality, uneven connectivity, and, shall we say, patchy 
cooperation. The framework I develop in this dissertation is designed to adapt 
nicely to these circumstances, thus allowing the application of Cloud 
computing. 
8.3 Nomadic users 
Smartphones and tablets are increasingly becoming popular. All these 
devices now have fairly large storage (for agenda, contacts and other data) that 
acts as a cache when the device is offline. In the case of data shared among a 
network of friend, co-workers, etc., synchronization is guaranteed by a central 
server (e.g. Google Calendar) when connection is up. When shared data is 
sensitive, my system allows a “protected” synchronization without disclosing 
information on a Public Cloud (again, Google Calendar is a good example 
here). 
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9 MY APPROACH: THE iPRIVACY 
SYSTEM 
In this Chapter, I provide a semi-formal description of my architecture and of the 
interaction among its component by means of UML diagrams. I show how the architecture 
satisfies some general requirements, including protecting data privacy , supporting fine-
grained access control and providing a grant-and-revoke capability. 
I am now ready to present in detail my approach, that I named iPrivacy. 
To simplify the discussion, I introduce the following assumptions:  
 Each dossier has only one owner; 
 Only the dossier's owner can change it. 
These assumptions permit the use of an elementary cascade synchronization 
in which the owner will submit the changes to the receivers. However, they 
can be relaxed at the cost of a higher complexity in synchronization [34]. 
My approach consists of two parts: a trusted client and a remote untrusted 
synchronizer (see Figure 35).  
The client maintains local data storage where:  
 The dossiers that she owns are (or at least can be) stored as plaintext; 
 The others, instead, are encrypted each with a different key.  
The Synchronizer stores the keys to decrypt the shared dossiers owned by the 
local client and the modified dossiers to synchronize.  
When another client needs to decrypt a dossier, she connects to the 
Synchronizer and obtains the corresponding decryption key.  
The data and the keys are stored in two separate entities, none of which can 
access information without the collaboration of the other part.  
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Figure 35 Deployment diagram of the distributed system  
9.1 Structure  
From the architectural point of view, I divide the system into two 
packages, a local one (client agent), which contains the dossier plus additional 
information such as access lists, and a remote one (global synchronizer), 
which contains the list of dossiers to synchronize, their decryption keys and 
the public keys of clients.  
A UML view of involved classes is shown in Figure 36: 
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Figure 36 iPrivacy’s class view 
9.2 Grant  
An owner willing to grant rights on a dossier must follow the sequence in 
Figure 37.  
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Figure 37 Grant sequence 
Namely, for each receiver, the owner:  
 Generates the decryption key  
 Encrypts it with the public key of the receiver to ensure that others 
cannot read it 
 Signs it with its private key to ensure its origin  
 Sends it to the Synchronizer, which verifies the origin and adds it to the 
storage of the decoding keys. The key is still encrypted with the public 
key of the receiver, so only the receiver can read it.  
9.3 Send  
When an owner modifies a dossier, she sends it to the Synchronizer using 
the sequence in Figure 38.  
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Figure 38 Send sequence 
For each receiver, the owner:  
 Generates a "pending dossier" by removing information that the 
receiver should not have access to;  
 Encrypts the pending dossier with the previously generated decryption 
key; 
 Signs with his own private key to certificate its origin; 
 Sends it to the Synchronizer, which verifies the origin and adds it to the 
storage of "pending dossiers”. Again, the dossier is still encrypted with 
the public key of the receiver, so only the receiver can read it.  
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9.4 Receive  
Periodically, each client updates un-owned dossiers by following the 
sequence in Figure 39.  
  
Figure 39 Receive sequence 
Each client: 
 Requests the "pending dossiers" to the Synchronizer. 
 Stores the (still encrypted) dossier in the local storage; 
 Removes the received dossiers from the Synchronizer. 
9.5 Use  
When a client needs to access an unowned (encrypted) dossier, the 
sequence in Figure 40 is used. 
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Figure 40 Use sequence 
The client:  
 Asks the Synchronizer for the decryption key (that is encrypted by her 
public key); 
 Decrypts it with her private key;  
 Decrypts the dossier by the resulting decryption key. 
If the decryption key does not exist, two options are available:  
 The record is deleted from the local datastore because a revoke 
happened; 
 The record remains cached (encrypted) into the local datastore because 
access rights to it could be restored. 
9.6 Revoke  
To revoke access to a receiver, it is sufficient to delete the corresponding 
decryption key from the Synchronizer. The sequence is designed in the UML 
diagram of Figure 41. 
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Figure 41 Revoke sequence 
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10 CONGRUENCE BETWEEN PLANNED 
AND ACHIEVED GOALS 
Using state diagrams of each component of the system, I will asses to which level my 
architecture satisfies the initial requirements for privacy protection and access control 
management. 
The initial requirements for my project were: privacy protection towards 
Cloud platform, fine-grained data access control, and grant-and-revoke 
permission on shared data. 
At the start, I noted that the Presentation Layer may not rest on the Cloud 
side, exactly to avoid exposing clear-text data to potential inner attacks. For 
this purpose, I moved the presentation logic to the client side. The next step 
was moving also the data layer from Cloud to client side, to prevent 
performance degradation. 
In the end I obtained a distributed architecture and a framework for data 
synchronization, but is the resulting system compliant with the initial 
requirements? 
Let us examine again each component involved in the system: 
 Client, distinct by role in: 
o Sender, and 
o Receiver; 
 Synchronizer, and  
 Network. 
 112 
10.1 The Sender component (client side) 
A Client, when acting as Sender, manages only its own data. It transmits 
the modified local data to the Synchronizer. Obviously, the Sender has both 
the owned dossiers and the related decrypting keys in clear-text form. 
However, this does not violate the requirements. 
The Sender initiated actions are: Grant, Send, and Revoke. 
Essentially, when revoking access rights, the sender decides which dossiers 
have to be shared, who are the receivers, and what part of information each of 
them receives. This role, therefore, is related only to the last of the initial 
requirements. 
10.2 Receiver 
A Client, when acting as Receiver, manages shared (not owned data), 
interacting with the Synchronizer to receive public keys, pending dossiers and 
decrypting keys. 
The actions involved are: Receive, and Use. 
Figure 42 shows the state diagram of a Receiver: 
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Figure 42 Receiver’s state diagram 
Let us analyze each state in detail: 
1. The receiver starts in idle state (state 1) and there it remains until a 
synchronization occurs.  
2. At that moment, the client goes into state 2 and receives some 
(encrypted) dossier, which it stores, still encrypted, in the 
PendingDossiersStore. In this state, the receiver has not yet access to 
information. 
3. When the receiver wants to access a shared dossier, it asks for the 
decrypting key and, if this is present, receives it from the Synchronizer. 
Then the Receiver goes into state 3, where it has either the (encrypted) 
dossier either the related clear-text decrypting key. It will store the 
latter only in main memory, never in the persistent storage. Hence the 
dossier is still encrypted; if the decrypting key is not present, then the 
Receiver goes back into state 2. 
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4. The next step consists of decrypting the shared dossier by the 
decrypting key. The Receiver goes into state 4, in which it has the clear 
text dossier, but it doesn't permanently store this information, limiting 
itself manipulating clear-text data in main memory.  
At DB restart, the Receiver resumes to state 2). 
As a result, in no state there is a permanent storage of clear-text data. 
The received information is limited to the portion that the owner has sent (this 
satisfies the “fine-grained access”, requirement 0). 
If at step 3 the decrypting key is not found, because it was revoked by the 
owner, then the dossier remains inaccessible. Hence, the “grant-and-revoke 
permission on shared data”, requirement 3, is satisfied). 
10.3 Synchronizer 
The Synchronizer manages public keys, pending dossiers and decrypting 
keys. 
The actions in which it is involved are: Grant, Send, Receive, Use, and Revoke. 
Figure 43 describes the state diagram of the Synchronizer: 
 
Figure 43 Synchronizer’s state diagram 
Let us again analyze each state: 
1. At the start, the Synchronizer is empty, i.e. it has nothing stored (state 
1). 
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2. When an owner grants the access for a dossier to another client, the 
Synchronizer goes to state 2, after receiving a decrypting key. That key 
is encrypted by the receiver’s public key, so it is not understandable by 
the Synchronizer.  
3. When the owner sends the pending dossier, this is returned encrypted 
by decrypting key. The Synchronizer passes to state 3, in which it is 
storing either the (encrypted) dossier either the (encrypted) related 
decrypting key. The dossier’s privacy is guaranteed by the decrypting 
key, which, in turn, is guarded by the receiver’s private key . 
4. When the receiver issues a “receive” command, the Synchronizer goes 
back to state 2 and returns the requested dossier, deleting it from its 
storage.  
5. The Synchronizer remains in state 2 if it processes a "use" command by 
the receiver, since this more does not alter the remote storage (it is a 
“read-only” command). 
6. At a “revoke” command issued by the owner, the Synchronizer goes 
back into state 1. 
In no state there is a clear-text data or a clear-text decrypting key, so the 
requirement 1 is satisfied. Requirements 2 and 3 are not applicable to the 
Synchronizer. 
 
10.4 Network 
For the network, as for the Synchronizer, only requirement 1 is applicable. I 
notice that each “message” sent on the network is encrypted: 
 Each decrypting key is encrypted by the receiver’s public key, and 
therefore it is readable only by means of the corresponding private key; 
 Each pending dossier is encrypted by decrypting key, and therefore it is 
readable only having this. Since I have showed that it is understandable 
only by the addressed receiver, for the transitive property, also the 
dossier has the same characteristic. 
 116 
10.5 References 
[7 ] Na dia Bennani, Ernesto Damiani, and Stelvio Cimato: “ Tow a r d Clou d-ba sed key  m a n a g em en t  for  
ou tsourced databases”, Computer Software and Applications Conference Workshops (COMPSACW), 2010 IEEE 34th 
A n n u a l,  pp. 2 3 2 -2 3 6  
[1 0] A ntonio Albano, Giorgio Ghelli, M. Eugenia Occhiuto, and Renzo Orsini: “Object-Orien ted Ga lileo” ,  On  
Object -Or ien ted Da ta ba se Sy stem  1 9 9 1 ,  pp. 8 7 -1 04  
[1 1 ] Fay  Chang, Jeffrey Dean, Sanjay Ghemawat, Wilson C. Hsieh, Deborah A. Wa lla ch , Mich a el Bu r r ow s, 
Tu shar Chandra, Andrew Fikes, and Robert Gruber: “Bigtable: A Distributed Storage System for Structu r ed Da ta ” ,  
OSDI 2 006 , pp. 2 05 -2 1 8  
[2 1 ] Miseon Choi, Wonik Park, and Young-Kuk Kim: “A split sy nchronizing mobile transaction model”, ICUIMC 
2 008 , pp.1 9 6 -2 01  
[2 6 ] Ra ju Halder, Shantanu Pal and Agostino Cortesi: “Watermarking Techniques for Rela t ion a l Da ta ba ses: 
Survey, Classification and Comparison”, in Journal of Universal Computer Science, vol.  1 6  (2 1 ),  pp. 3 1 6 4 -3 1 9 0  
[9 5 ] Ha kan Hacigümüs, Bala Iy er, Sharad Mehrotra, “Providing Database as a Service”, Proceedings of the 18th  
In ter n a t ion a l Con fer en ce on  Da ta  En g in eer in g  (ICDEí02 ),  2 002 , pp. 1 -1 0  
[9 6 ] A lex a n der  Len k,  Ma rkus Klems, Jens Nimis, Stefan Tai, Thomas Sandholm, “What's inside the Clou d? 
A n  a r ch itectu r a l m a p of th e Clou d la n dsca pe” ,  Pr oceedin g  of CLOUD 2 009 , 2 009 , pp .  2 3 -3 1  
[9 7 ] Seny Kamara, Kristin Lauter: Cryptographic Cloud Storage. Financial Cryptography Workshops 2010:136 -
1 4 9  
[9 8 ] K. La i, L. Rasmusson, E. Adar, S. Sorkin, L. Zhang, and B. A. Huberman. Tycoon: an Im plem en tion  of a  
Distributed Market-Based Resource Allocation System. Multiagent and Grid Systems, 1(3):16 9 –1 8 2 , A u g . 2 005 .  
[9 9 ] M. Hibler, R. Ricci, L. Stoller, J. Duerig, S. Guruprasad, T. Stack, K. Webb, and J. Lepr ea u . La r g e -sca le 
V irtualization in the Emulab Network Testbed. In Proceedings of the 2008 USENIX Annual Technical Con fer en ce,  
2 008 .  
[1 00] Hew lett -Pa cka r d. HP In teg r a ted Lig h ts-Ou t  2  User  Gu ide. Tech n ica l r epor t ,  HP, 2 009 .  
[1 01 ] D. Nurmi, R. Wolski, C. Grzegorczyk, G. Obertelli, S. So man, L. Youseff, and D. Zagorodnov. Eu ca ly ptu s 
open -sou r ce clou d-com pu tin g  sy stem . In  CCA 08 : Clou d Com pu tin g  a n d Its A pplica t ion s ,  2 008 .  
[1 02 ] Giuseppa DeCandia and Deniz Hastorun and Madan Jampani and Gunavardhan Kakulapati and Av in a sh  
La kshman and Alex Pilchin and Swaminathan Sivasubramanian and Peter Vosshall and Werner V og els.  Dy n a m o: 
A mazon’s Highly Available Key-Value Store. In ACM Sy m posiu m  on  Oper a t in g  Sy stem s Pr in ciples,  2 007 .  
[1 03 ] K. Keahey and T. Freeman. Contextualization: Providing one-click virtual clusters. In eScience 2008, 2008. 
[1 04 ] B. Sotomayor, R. Montero, I.  M. Llorente, and I. Foster. Capacity Leasing in  Clou d Sy stem s u sin g  th e 
Open Nebu la  En g in e. In  CCA 08 : Clou d Com pu tin g  a n d its A pplica t ion s,  2 008 .  
[1 05 ] Da v id Recordon, Drummond Reed: OpenID 2.0: a platform for user-centric identity management. Dig ita l 
Iden tity  Ma n a g em en t  2 006 :1 1 -1 6  
[1 5 8 ] Fr ance, R.B., Ghosh, S., Trong, T.D., Solberg, A.: Model driven development using uml 2.0: Promises a n d  
pit fa lls.  IEEE Com pu ter  3 9  (Febr u a r y  2 006 ) 5 9 –6 6  
[1 5 9 ] Smith, S.;   Beaulieu, A.;   Phillips, W.G.;  Dept. of Electr. & Comput. Eng., R. Mil. Coll. of Canada, Kingston, 
ON, Canada, “Modeling and verifying security protocols using UML 2,” Systems Conference (Sy sCon ),  2 01 1  IEEE 
In ter n a t ion a l 2 01 1 ,  pp. 7 2  - 7 9  
 
 117 
Part III - Validation 
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11 EXPERIMENTATION 
A real implementation of my architecture allowed us to test and benchmark the system. The 
realization is composed of a client application that uses a custom in-memory database with 
row-level encryption, and a remote synchronizer to manage inter-node communications.  
To experiment with my architecture I implemented the custom client and 
Synchronizer. The client needs to use row-level encryption. In the usual 
RDBMSs, however, this technique has significant disadvantages in terms of 
performance and functionality: querying would be possible only through the 
construction of appropriate indexes for each column of the table (with a 
considerable waste of resources both in terms of time and space), while the 
constraints and foreign keys would be almost unusable.  
Another major issue concerns the management of keys: row-level encryption 
could potentially lead to the generation and maintenance (and / or 
distribution) of a key for each row of each table encrypted with this method. 
To solve (or reduce) the concern, I use some advanced techniques of key 
management, such as: 
 Broadcast (or Group) encryption [32]: rows are divided into 
equivalence classes, based on recipients. Every class is encrypted using 
an asymmetric algorithm where the encryption key is made in a way 
that each recipient can decrypt the information using only its own 
private key. Both the public and the private keys are generated by a 
trusted entity. 
 Identity Based Encryption [30]: it bounds the encryption key to the 
identity of the recipient. Each recipient generates by itself a key pair 
used to encrypt/decrypt information. 
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 Attribute Based Encryption [31]: it bounds the encryption key to an 
attribute (a group) of recipient. Each recipient receives from a trusted 
entity the private key used to decrypt, while the sender calculates the 
encryption key. 
The complexity of these techniques is a major reason why conventional 
RDBMSs do not use encryption at the row-level. 
To solve or reduce this limitation, I propose to use IMDBs to store the 
encrypted rows. 
While IMDBs are limited by the amount of main memory in the host 
computer, they are well suited to be distributed and replicated across multiple 
nodes to increase capacity and performance. 
The proposed approach works around this limitation: not having a single 
central database containing the whole data, I preferred to give one database 
for each client application. This database contains only owned data, while 
external data will be added (or removed) via the synchronizer, based on access 
permissions. 
To minimize cryptography overhead, I encrypt only rows "received" by other 
nodes, while rows owned by the local node are stored in clear-text form. 
Well-known open-source implementations of IMDB are Apache Derby, 
HyperSQL (HSQLDB) and SQLite. For my implementation, I chose to use 
HyperSQL rel. 2.0. 
 
11.1 HyperSql 
HyperSQL5 0  is a pure Java RDBMS. Its strength is, besides the lightness 
(about 1.3Mb for version 2.0), the capability to run either as a Server instance 
either as a module internal to an application (in-process). 
A database started in-process has the advantage of speed, but it is dedicated 
only to the containing application (no other application can query the 
database). For my purposes, I chose server mode. In this way, the database 
engine runs inside a JVM and will start one or more "in-process” databases, 
listening requests from processes in the local machine or remote computers.  
                                                 
2  www.hsqldb.org 
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For interactions between clients and database server, we can use three 
different protocols: 
 HSQL Server: the fastest and most used. It implements a proprietary 
communication protocol; 
 HTTP Server: it is used when access to the server is limited only to 
HTTP. It consists of a web server that allows JDBC clients to connect 
over http; 
 HTTP Servlet: as the Http Server, but it is used when accessing the 
database is managed by a servlet container or by an application servlet 
(e.g. Tomcat). It is limited to using a single database. 
Several different types of databases (called catalogs) can be created with 
HyperSQL. The difference between them is the methodology  adopted for data 
storage: 
 res: this type of catalog provides for the storage of data into small JAR 
or ZIP files; 
 mem: data is stored completely in the machine’s RAM, so there is no 
persistence of information outside of the application life cycle in the 
JVM; 
 file: data is stored in files residing into the file system of the machine.  
In my work I used the latter type of databases. 
A catalog file can use up to six files on the file system for its operations, the 
most important of which are: 
 .log: used to periodically save data from the database, to prevent data 
loss in case of a crash; and 
 .script: containing the table definitions and other components of the 
DB, plus data of not-cached tables. 
Besides these files, HyperSQL can connect to CSV files.  
A client application can connect to HyperSQL server using the JDBC driver 
(.Net and ODBC drivers are “in late stages of development”), specifying the 
type of database to access (file, mem or res). 
HyperSQL implements the SQL standard either for temporary tables either for 
persistent ones. Temporary tables (TEMP) are not stored on the file system 
and their life cycle is limited to the duration of the connection (i.e. of the 
Connection object). The visibility of data in a TEMP table is limited to the 
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context of connection used to populate it. With regard to the persistent tables, 
instead, HyperSQL provides three different types of tables, according to the 
method used to store the data: 
 MEMORY: it is the default option when a table is created without 
specifying the type. Memory table data is kept entirely in memory, 
while any change to its structure or contents is recorded in .log and 
.script files. These two files are read at the opening of database to load 
data into memory. All changes are saved when closing the database. 
These processes can take a long time in the case of tables larger than 10 
MB. 
 CACHED: when this type of table is chosen, only part of the data (and 
related indexes) is stored in memory, thus allowing the use of large 
tables at the expense of performance. 
 TEXT: the data is stored in formatted files such as .csv. 
In my implementation, I use MEMORY tables. 
Figure 44 summarizes the structure of HyperSQL. 
 
Figure 44 HyperSQL Structure 
The Loader and the Serializer are the main parts of HyperSQL that I analyzed 
and modified. They are the mechanisms that load the data from text files at 
the opening and save them to the database at closing. 
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11.1.1 Loader 
I suppose that the client connects to the DBMS using instructions like: 
Class.forName("org.hsqldb.jdbcDriver" ); 
Connection c = DriverManager.getConnection( 
 "jdbc:hsqldb:file:myDB", "SA", ""); 
 
Having used a catalog of file type, the static method newSession() of class 
org.hsql.DatabaseManager is called. Its task is to open the database or to 
connect to it (if it is already opened). org.hsql.Database is the class that 
represents the instance of the database in memory, so this is the root of all 
data structures designed to contain the information of the database. Once the 
database is loaded into memory, two fundamental classes are used for the 
parsing of text files: org.hsqldb.ParserCommand (for management of sessions 
and statements) and org.hsqldb.Scanner (for the recognition of individual 
SQL tokens). The class responsible for maintaining the database (related to 
the session) is org.hsqldb.SessionData, whose main attributes are: 
private final Database database; 
private final Session session; 
PersistentStoreCollectionSession persistentStoreCollection; 
PersistentStore is the data structure that contains all rows in a database table. 
Specifically, this is an interface implemented by using different classes 
depending on the type of table represented: in my case I use MEMORY tables, 
so that the affected class is the org.hsqldb.persist.RowStoreAVLMemory. 
When the Database object is created, particularly at the invocation of method 
reopen(), the class org.hsqldb.persist.Logger, which is the class that 
represents the interface for I/O to and from text files of the database, is 
instantiated. The starter method of Logger class is openPersistence(), which 
will open the specified database (if the database is new, the related text files 
are created). The class org.persist.Log is instantiated after verifying the 
integrity of the .properties file. My focus is on method open() of this class 
which checks the status of the Database (if it was closed properly, if it was 
modified, and so on) and then instantiates the class 
org.hsqldb.scriptio.ScriptReaderText to read the .script file using the method 
readAll(Session s). The class org.hsqldb.rowio.RowInputTextLog is used to 
read a single line of the database and the object that represents a row in the 
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database is the object Row. Two methods of class ScriptReaderText are 
invoked: 
 readDDL(): reads the DDL statements and initialize a class 
RowInputTextLog for each line read from the .script file. 
 readExistingData(): it extrapolates the values of each single line, 
initializes the row and adds it to the PersistentStore; 
Because of the database file structure, I need to look for Insert statements to 
find the rows of a table. When one of these statements is encountered, it is 
managed by the method processStatement(Session s) of ScriptReaderText 
class. For each field in the row, it checks whether it is primary key and 
determines the data type, then the value of the field is read by the method 
readData (DataType t) of RowInputTextLog class.  
The sequence of operations is shown in the UML diagram of Figure 45. 
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Figure 45 Loader’s sequence 
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11.1.2 Insert 
When the client issues a SQL Insert command, it is managed by the Table 
class, which calls the getNewCachedObject() method() of class 
PersistentStore, which add the node through the RowStoreAVLMemory class. 
In the end, the new data is in place into the self-balancing binary search tree 
in main memory. The persistent storage is not involved in this activity. It will 
be used, instead, in the serializer’s actions. 
The sequence of operations is shown in the UML diagram of Figure 46. 
 
 
Figure 46 SQL Insert sequence 
 
 
11.1.3 Serializer 
The Serializer is the module responsible for saving the modified data into 
.script and .log files. Changes are initially written in .log file and moved to the 
.script file, when a shutdown command is issued.  
The sequence of operations is shown in the UML diagram of Figure 47. 
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Figure 47 Serializer’s sequence 
Each database table is represented by an instance of class org.hsqldb.Table, 
comprising: data structures for the management of content, methods for 
creating a new table, and operations of insert/select rows. When inserting a 
new row, the method insertSingleRow() of the Table class is invoked; the first 
step is to create a new Row object for caching data in memory, which is done 
by the method getNewCachedObject (Session s, Object [ ] data) of 
PersistentStore class. Memory-type tables are kept in a balanced tree structure 
(AVL) implemented in the class org.hsqldb.persist.RowStoreAVLMemory. 
Once a node (i.e. the row being inserted) is built and added to the AVL (this 
operation involves several checks on the contents of the fields and of integrity 
constraints), HyperSQL writes the row into the buffer and then transfers it to 
the text file (data is written to the .log file until shutdown of the database). To 
perform this task, the Logger class utilizes the method 
writeInsertStatement(Session s, Table t, Object [] data), and the method 
writeInsertStatement() of the Log class. Writing to the file is done using the 
 127 
class org.hsqldb.scriptio.ScriptWriterBase (more precisely, in case of memory -
type tables, the ScriptWriterText subclass). The method writeRow(Session s, 
Table t, Object [] data) of ScriptWriterText class writes data to a text buffer 
and, at the end of the procedure, transfers it to the file. The buffer (which is 
only a byte[ ]) is encapsulated in the class RowOutputBase (more precisely, in 
case of memory-type tables, the RowOutputTextLog subclass), which extends 
the HsqlByteArrayOutputStream and provides methods to transform any type 
of data for serializing it into the buffer. Once writing to the buffer is 
completed, the method writeRowOutToFile() of ScriptWriterText class is 
used, which calls the method write(byte [ ] b) of the class OutputStream to 
write into the output stream of .log file. When shutting down the database, 
method writeScript() of Log class is invoked with the following tasks: creating 
temporary file for writing .script file, loading each element of the database into 
memory and writing it to the file by executing the flush() of the OutputStream 
connected to the file.  
In Figure 48 there is an instance of a .script file, containing the SQL 
statements to create and populate the DB. 
 
Figure 48 .script file’s structure 
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11.2 Prototype System 
11.2.1 Client side 
On the client side, using IMDBs, I have only two interactions between each 
local agent and the Synchronizer (see Figure 49). 
 
Figure 49 State diagram of client 
I have modified the classes included in file hsqldb.jar to handle encryption. 
The basic idea was to manage encryption in the .log and .script text files. The 
rows that are owned by the local client are stored in clear-text, while the 
shared rows “granted” by other owners are stored encrypted. 
The values contained in tables are stored in form of SQL insert: 
INSERT INTO table_name(field_1, field_2, …, field_n) VALUES(value_1, value_2, 
…, value_n) 
Earlier, to obtain control access granularity at the field level, I encrypted field 
by field. This way, the text contained in the database file is in the form of: 
INSERT INTO table_name(field_1, field_2, …, field_n) VALUES(pk, 
encrypted_value_2, …, encrypted_value_n) 
The primary key pk needs to be in clear-text, since it is used to retrieve the 
decrypting keys from the central Synchronizer. I dropped this idea because it 
requires changing the I/O code for each possible database type and an 
attacker may obtain some information such as table, primary key and number 
of rows. 
My current solution is to encrypt the whole row by AES symmetric algorithm. 
The encryption overhead is lower than the previous solution and all 
information is hidden to curious eyes. To relate the encrypted row (stored 
locally) to the decrypting key (stored in the remote Synchronizer), I use a new 
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key (id_pending_row). The encrypted row is prefixed by a clear-text header 
containing the id_pending_row delimited by “$” and “@”. The encrypted 
value is then stored in a hexadecimal representation, so a generic row is of the 
form: 
$27@5DAAAED5DA06A8014BFF305A93C957D 
11.2.1.1 Load time 
At load time, the .script file will contain clear-text and encrypted rows, as 
the example shown in Figure 50. 
 
Figure 50 Modified .script file’s structure 
The class whose task is reading the file and loading the appropriate data in 
memory is ScriptReaderText, whose Class Diagram is the showed in Figure 51. 
 
Figure 51 UML of ScriptReaderText class 
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The readLoggedStatement method parses each line of text in the .log or .script 
files and forwards the result to the processStatement method, which loads 
data into memory. 
I changed the readLoggedStatement method to make a preprocessing: if it 
finds a record header (enclosed between $ and @) in the text line, it extracts 
the id_pending_row_received. Using this id, the client requests to the central 
Synchronizer the related decoding key, which it uses to decrypt the entire text 
line and to proceed with normal HyperSQL management. If the decoding key 
is unavailable, the text line is temporarily discarded (it is not deleted if it was 
not received for communication problem with the Synchronizer).  
The sequence of operations is shown in Figure 52. 
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Figure 52 Modified Loader’s sequence 
11.2.1.2 Save time 
The class ScriptWriterText, whose Class Diagram is shown in Figure 53, 
manages the write operations in .log and .script files.  
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Figure 53 UML of ScriptWriterText class 
The affected methods are writeRow and writeRowOutToFile.  
The former deals with building the string that will be written into the text file 
(INSERT INTO ....) witch corresponds to the in memory data. A Table 
instance contains the information about the table structure (table name, field 
names, types of data, constraints, etc.). The values of fields are in an array of 
Object. The SQL insert is written in a text buffer that is stored in the .script file 
by the method writeRowOutToFile. Because each table has an 
id_pending_row_received column, I modified the writeRow method to check 
if the row is owned or shared by another user. In the latter case 
(id_pending_row_received not null), the custom writeRowOutToFileCrypto 
method is used instead of the writeRowOutToFile method. 
WriteRowOutToFileCrypto uses the parameter id_pending_row_received to 
query the related symmetric encryption key from the Synchronizer, needed to 
encrypt the whole buffer. The result is a hexadecimal sequence which is 
prefixed by the below header with the id_pending_row_received. 
The resulting sequence of operations is shown in Figure 54. 
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Figure 54 Modified Serializer’s sequence 
11.2.2 Server side 
When a data owner adds or updates a row in the local database, it needs to 
distribute this change to all the related users. To do this, I put in the Cloud a 
central Synchronizer server that acts as a mailbox. 
It uses a simple database with the following tables: 
 Users: containing, among others, the id and public key of each user; 
 Pending Rows: it contains the rows that were added / modified in the 
local database of the owner, until they are delivered to destination. A 
unique row_id is automatically assigned to each pending row. Other 
information is submission date, sender and receiver. The changed row 
is stored in encrypted form in field encrypted_row; 
 Decrypting keys: contains the keys that are used to decrypt the pending 
rows. Other information is: sender, receiver, expiry date, id_row. 
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At modification time, the owner (client side) has to: 
 Serialize the row; 
 Generate a symmetric key to encrypt it; 
 Encrypt the row; 
 Encrypt the key by the public keys of receivers; 
 Send the encrypted row and the decoding keys to receiver. 
Because I store the serialized row, I haven't to worry about columns data 
types. 
The Synchronizer uses RMI to expose its services to clients. The services are 
grouped into three interfaces: 
 KeyInterface with methods related to encryption keys: depositKey, 
deleteDecriptingKey, getDecriptingKeyByIdPendingRow, 
getPublicKeyByUser; 
 SynInterface with methods for sharing the rows: sendRow, 
getPendingRowForUser, getAllUsers, resendRow; 
 RegistrationInterface to register and manage users: registerUser, 
SelectUserById, selectUserByIdAndPassword. 
Figure 55 shows the Class Diagram of the resulting system. 
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Figure 55 Synchronizer’s class diagram 
11.3 Performances 
In contrast to the usual row-level encryption, which needs 
encryption/decryption at every data access, my solution uses these heavy 
operations only when communicating with Synchronizer, with a clear 
advantage, especially in the case of rarely modified databases. 
11.3.1 Read operations 
The system uses decryption only at start time, when records are loaded 
from the disk into the main memory. Each row is decrypted none (if it is 
owned by local node) or just once (if it is owned by a remote node), so this is 
optimal for read operations. Each decryption implies an access to the remote 
Synchronizer to download the related decrypting key and, eventually, the 
modified row. 
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11.3.2 Write operations 
Write operations occur when a record is inserted/updated into the DB. In 
principle there is no overhead until the client, once it gets online, explicitly 
synchronizes data with the central server. At synchronization time, for each 
modified record, the client needs to: 
 Generate a new (symmetric) key; 
 Encrypt the record, and 
 Dispatch the encrypted data and the decrypting key to the remote 
synchronizer 
In the next Section, I will address the scalability that arises when 
synchronization/write operations are done massively. 
11.3.3 Benchmark 
To guarantee scalability, it is tantamount to measure the overhead that 
encryption brings to the custom version of HyperSQL for iPrivacy (henceforth, 
encHyperSQL). To do so, I wrote a test application that uses the encHyperSQL 
driver and interacts with the other clients through the Synchronizer. It 
performs several distinct activities: 
 Creation of database and sample tables 
 Population of tables with sample values 
 Sharing of a portion of data with another user 
 Receiving shared dossiers from other users 
 Opening the newly created (and populated) database  
At the start, the application receives three parameters: 
 Number of dossiers 
 Number of clients who will be sharing, and 
 Percentage of shared dossiers 
The above setup is needed to evaluate the inherent overhead that I introduce 
in my system w.r.t. the original HyperSQL, regardless of communication 
delays. To minimize the latter, the central Synchronizer and the clients ran on 
the same computer. During experiments, for testing purposes, it was sufficient 
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to use only two clients (to enable data sharing). For the sake of comparison, I 
have set up a “competing” application with the following characteristics: 
 It uses the original HyperSQL driver; 
 It doesn’t share data with other clients, since the original HyperSQL 
has not this capability;  
 When populating the database, it creates the same number of dossiers 
than the previous application; after benchmarking, however, it adds the 
number of shared dossiers, resulting in the same final number of 
dossiers. 
I benchmarked the system using single-table dossiers of about 200 bytes, in 
two batteries of tests; the first with 20%, and the second with 40% of shared 
dossiers, which numbered from 1,000 to 500,000. The results are represented 
by the graphs from Figure 56 to Figure 58. It is worth noting that the overhead 
percentage of the modified solution rapidly decreases (with 100,000 dossiers 
it is around 10%), either in the first battery of tests (Figure 56), and either in 
the second (Figure 57). In the tests, the total delay (load + create + populate + 
receive) is linear in the number of dossiers and is limited, even with a huge 
number of dossiers (Figure 58). Local results can be slightly altered by 
external events not preventable (e.g., garbage collector). 
11.3.4 Results 
The delay of the system is tightly bound to communications effort with the 
central Synchronizer. Computing overhead is limited to just one encryption 
per record at write time and no more than one decryption per record at read 
time. Since I use symmetric encryption, these operations are very fast. The 
benchmark demonstrates that the delay is substantially concentrated in 
database opening, while the subsequent use does not involve additional 
delays, compared to the unmodified version. 
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Figure 56 Overhead when 20% of dossiers are shared 
 
Figure 57 Overhead when 40% of dossiers are shared 
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Figure 58 Total delay 
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12 SCALABILITY 
The previous test implementation used a custom synchronizer that is almost inadequate to 
stress test. For this purpose, I adapted my protocols to use a general email service like Gmail 
as synchronizer, and evaluated the system in a large community. 
The scalability tests need a large users’ network, so I resolved to use an 
email service on the Cloud as Synchronizer. For testing purpose I am using 
Gmail by Google5 1 . For enhancing performance, I want to use a synchroClient 
thread that connects to Gmail to exchange the modified dossiers. Some 
relevant modifications occur for adequate to the existing email architecture: 
1. I have adopted the Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) to interact 
with the server; 
2. IMAP lacks the ability for a sender to delete a previously sent message, 
so the revoke is not on charge of Server, but it is given to client; 
3. In the same way, the client is responsible to delete the emails 
accordingly to my algorithm. 
 
12.1 The new architecture 
The resulting architecture can be represented by the class diagram in 
Figure 59, where are represented the following classes: 
1. Client, which represents the client application. Important attributes are 
the structures: 
                                                 
5 1  www.gmail.com 
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a. pkHashMap to store the public keys of collaborators 
b. dkHashMap to store the decrypting keys of dossiers 
c. prList to store the pending rows (the received dossiers ) 
2. Gmail, which represents the email server 
3. PK, which represents the public key 
4. DK, which represents the decoding key  
5. PR, which represents the pending row. 
 
Figure 59 Class diagram 
 
Referencing to Figure 49, the synchroClient runs almost once, at start of 
client, but can run every time the client is online. While in my original 
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approach the client queries the Synchronizer every time it needs to decrypt a 
row, now the synchroClient connects to the email server and receives all the 
messages in a single session. 
The client C sends to Gmail three types of messages: 
1. C’s public key: the message has subject “PK” and the body message 
contains the public key of C. The message is sent to all the clients 
collaborating with C. 
2. Decrypting keys: for each dossier D, a decrypting keys is created at 
every change. The key is then sent to all the clients collaborating with C 
for D, after it has been encrypted using the receiver’s public key. The 
message has subject “DK”+<dossierId> and the body message contains 
the encrypted key. 
3. Modified dossiers: for each dossier D, the message has subject “PR” 
(Pending Row)+<dossierId> and the body message contains the 
dossiers, encrypted using a Decoding Key. The message is sent to all the 
clients collaborating with C for D. 
 
12.2 The synchronization phase 
To synchronize, a client follows the steps in Figure 60: 
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Figure 60 The synchro sequence diagram 
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More in detail: 
1. sendUpdates: 
a. The client sends the PK to all the collaborators (only the very 
first time the collaboration starts); 
b. For each modified dossier D, the client finds the corresponding 
decrypting key DKD and the list of collaborators. For each 
receiver R, the client encrypts DKD using PKR and sends it to R; 
c. For each modified dossier D, the client encrypts it using DKD 
and sends the result to all the collaborators. 
2. receiveUpdate: during this phase, the client receives the emails from 
Gmail and manage them accordingly to the subject. 
a. Subject “PK”: manage the corresponding public key; 
b. Subject starts by “DK”: manage the corresponding decrypting 
key; 
c. Subject starts by “PR”: manage the corresponding pending row. 
12.2.1 managePK 
The activity for managing the PK, as shown in Figure 61, consists of: 
1. Extracting the public key from the body of the email  
2. Adding the couple <sender‘s email address, pk> to the structure 
pkHashMap 
3. Deleting the message 
 
Figure 61 managePK’s activity diagram 
12.2.2 manageDK 
The activity for managing the DK, as shown in Figure 62, consists in: 
1. Extracting the encrypted DK from the body of the email  
2. Decrypting it using the private key of the receiver 
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3. Extracting the dossierId from the body of the email 
4. Adding the couple <dossierId, dk> to the structure dkHashMap 
 
Figure 62 manageDK’s activity diagram 
12.2.3 managePR 
The activity for managing the PR, as shown in Figure 63, consists in: 
1. Extracting the encrypted PR from the body of the email  
2. Extracting the dossierId from the body of the email 
3. Adding the string $dossierId@encryptedPR to the structure prList 
4. Deleting the message 
 
Figure 63 managePR’s activity diagram 
Please, note that, at the end, the row is not decrypted yet. 
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The prList is then usually processed, using the dkHashMap to decrypt it and 
to insert in the memory database the corresponding row. 
12.3 Considerations 
At start time, the client applies the algorithms exposed above to all the 
messages in the email server. At subsequent synchronization, instead, it can 
read only the new messages, which contain the changes occurred in the 
meantime. 
Only the DKs are maintained in the email server, the other messages are 
erased after being read. At a generic moment T the emails’ queue in the email 
server is of the form shown in Table 10. 
Table 10 Emails’ queue 
Dk1  
Decrypting keys of previously 
read pending rows 
A large number 
Dk2  
… 
Dkn  
Pki Public key for new 
collaborations 
Some, frequently none 
Pkj 
Dkd1  
Decrypting key of dossier D, 
encrypted by the public keys 
of the m collaborators 
Some 
Dkd2  
… 
Dkdm  
Prd Pending row for document D Some 
The first band is read only at startup, while the others are read only during the 
subsequent synchronizations.  
Now, let be: 
 NR the number of the (read) messages in the first band 
 NC the number of new collaborators 
 NPR the number of just received dossiers 
 NG the average of collaborators for a given dossier 
 Spk  the size of a public decrypting key (this is a constant quantity, 
depending on number of bits used for asymmetric encryption) 
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 Sdk  the size of a decrypting key (this is a constant quantity, that depends 
on the number of bits used for symmetric encryption), and 
 Sd the size of a dossier 
 
Ses, the size of email queue (minus the header of the messages) is 
approximated by the formula: 
Ses  = NR * Sdk  + NC * Spk  + NPR *( Spk  * NG + Sd) 
In a static environment, where the workgroup is stable and changes are rare, 
the order of Ses  is: 
Ses  = NR * Sdk  
so it is linear in the number of the shared dossiers. 
If ND is the number of the recorded dossiers and Ps  is the percentage of shared 
dossiers, the formula above can be written as: 
Ses  = ND * Ps  * Sdk  
 
Figure 64 Values of Ses for changing values of Ps 
In Figure 64, Ses is plotted for typical percentage values of Ps. These results can 
be easily related with the times one would obtain when downloading emails of 
the same size through Gmail. 
The results of this analysis are particularly interesting in the light of the 
Business Collaborative Environment scenarios described in Section 8. In such 
environment, the value of ND is usually less than 10,000 (e.g., in Italy, the law 
imposes to the family doctors are bound to have less than 2,000 patients; 
similarly, the average number of active legal proceedings a law firm handle is 
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1,5005 2 ), while the typical value of Ps  is less than 20%. As the graph reveals, 
under these conditions, the value of Ses  is very small, about some hundred of 
Kb; hence, the time for downloading the updates from the central server is 
expected to be only a few seconds. 
                                                 
5 2  source: P&P Informatics, ICT manager for legal offices in Italy – www.pep.it 
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13 COMPARISON WITH OTHER 
APPROACHES 
At this time, I don’t know similar architectures to compare with, but I want to analyze my 
data propagation to BE alternatives, to quantify the possible overhead of my approach. I 
compare not only with pure BE schemes, but also with the OSN adapted schemes.  
My system, after all the evolvements, still uses a Multiple AES (M-AES) 
propagation of information to all collaborating nodes which sends a different 
message with the same decrypting key to each receiver. As presented in 
chapter 4, a better solution consists in using broadcast encryption to minimize 
communication overhead. In the following I analyze the application of 
previously seen broadcast methods with my distributed architecture, with a 
particular attention to the aspects of secret keys generation and revocation 
capability. 
13.1 Threshold systems 
These systems assume the presence of one trusted Key Generator that 
assigns (and then knows) the secret key. Moreover, it is intended for spot 
transmission (as TV broadcasting), where the information is protected only 
during communication but not afterwards. It lacks the revocation’s capability, 
e.g. a protected TV transmission may be recorded and reused later. These two 
characteristic make this approach unfeasible for my architecture. 
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13.2 IBE 
It is not a BE system, but it allows users to choose their own key, so it 
doesn’t require a trusted service for private key generation. Using IBE we 
could send encrypted information to each user using her public key. This 
doesn’t diminish the number of messages sent and, since usually information 
size is greater than key size, the messages are heavier. Instead, it permits time-
bounded key, so it would be useful to distribute temporary decrypting keys for 
offline work. 
As a case study, if I use AES 256 bits encryption and a dossier size of 2000Kb, 
I obtain the following graph: 
 
Figure 65 Comparison between using IBE and M-AES 
13.3 ABE 
These systems assume the presence of one (or a group) trusted Key 
Generator that assigns (and then knows) the secret key s. In my architecture, 
the Generator cannot be the central Synchronizer, because otherwise the 
dossiers’ protection disappears. The use of DABE can mitigate this problem, 
since we can use a pool of Key Generators, distributing the responsibility on a 
larger number of actors to diminish the fault risk, but this is not an absolute 
assurance. The generator can be the owner, but this leads to the proliferation 
of keys as every node has to store a different secret key for each possible 
source of dossier. 
Moreover, it lacks the revocation’s capability , which was one of the initial 
requirements. 
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13.4 Persona 
Persona was introduced for OSN, but can be a model to evaluate in my 
system. As this, it encrypts data using symmetric key that is then distributed 
encrypted by a group key (ABE). This would reduce the number of messages 
sent to the other users, which would be limited to only one dossier and only 
one decrypting key. Unfortunately, the use of ABE to manage the group 
encryption brings back to the previous objections. 
13.5 GCC 
This system, introduced for OSN, can be adapted to my scenario. It seems 
a perfect solution because: 
 As IBE, each user autonomously choose her secret key without 
requiring a central key generator; 
 As ABE, it allows the BE, but the group key is generated from the public 
keys of the group’s component and it does not require a trusted server; 
 It allows delegation and revocation of access rights; 
 Each user has only a single private key and, although for each user is 
generated as many public keys as communities, they are used only 
when creating the group key (that is the key which is really used in 
encrypted communications) and then they are not locally stored. 
Although I was able to verify the formal correctness of the algorithm exposed 
in [57], during implementation of my test system some problems emerged.  
1. I was not able to implement the Converge method since: 
a. it is not clear what is the content of },{ iyi gx  (I supposed it is 
the couples <uid, pk> of interested nodes); 
b. to generate the group key, it needs the computing of 



m
j
vya jiii gg
1
,1)(  where: 
 v i+1 ,j is obtained from inversion of a Vandermonde 
matrix 
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 iyg  is usually implemented using an immutable 
arbitrary-precision integers (as Java’s BigInteger). 
i. in a first time, I inverted the Vandermonde matrix in R, 
but so the v i+1 ,j were real and it was impossible to 
calculate iag .Then, I realize that I have to invert the 
Vandermonde matrix in Zq. ; 
ii. after this step, the product to compute iag  uses 
BigInteger^BigInteger, that is not implemented in the 
usual languages (as Java or C++). 
2. if I solve the previous difficulty, I obtain a community key 
)g ,(l , ... ),g ,(l , {g  g
)f(l
1-m
)f(l
1k
1-m1  where each of the (2*m-1) terms is an 
integer of k bits. If I consider the usual values for AES’s key length=256 
bits and k=300 bits, I obtain the graph shown in Figure 66. 
 
Figure 66 Comparison between AES 256 bits and GCC 300 bits 
Even setting k=256 bit in GCC, its performances remains worse than M-AES, 
as shown in Figure 67. 
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Figure 67 Comparison between AES 256 bits and GCC 256 bits 
To make the results comparable, I need to set AES’s key length=128 bits and 
k=64 bits (see Figure 68). 
 
Figure 68 Comparison between AES 128 bits and GCC 64 bits 
13.6 Conclusions 
By tuning BE, one could in theory decrease the amount of data exchanged 
between the local Clients and the central Synchronizer. In practice, however, 
the examined solutions are either inadequate to the initial requirements (i.e. 
Threshold systems, ABE and Persona), or they introduce new complexities 
that cancel out the benefits of broadcasting (IBE and GCC). This result does 
not imply that BE is wholly inappropriate, but it stresses that further 
investigation would be needed before BE is deployed in this scenario. 
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14 VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 
My architecture was designed to assure data priv acy, but are there possible vulnerabilities? 
In this Chapter, using UML state diagrams, I present an analytic study of possible system 
failures. 
Having shown in the previous chapters that my architecture meets the 
initial requirements (data protection and revocation of permits), in this 
Chapter, I want to analyze possible vulnerability of my system. I will examine 
every component involved in the algorithms: 
 Client, distinct by role in: 
o Sender; 
o Receiver; 
 Synchronizer, and  
 Network. 
14.1 Client 
The use of IMDBs can lead to data loss if the client is interrupted (e.g. a 
hardware or application failure) before it writes data into the permanent 
storage. If data is owned by the client, there is nothing to do. If data was 
shared with another user, the client can ask to all collaborators to send again 
the shared dossiers. 
Another problem may be the identity theft: if someone succeeds to discovery 
the credential of a client, she can communicate with the synchronizer. If she 
sends her PK to all collaborators, she would have full access to all dossiers, 
since she can: 
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 Send fake dossiers  
 Can receive the dossiers which other clients sent to her. They were 
encrypted by her PK, and then she can decrypt them using her own SK.  
The problems above analyzed are related to client in general. In the following, 
instead, I will discuss the peculiar vulnerability of a client acting as sender or 
receiver. 
14.1.1 Sender 
The sender is autonomous in its work. It manages local data through Data 
Manipulation Language, even in offline state; sometimes, on demand, it sends 
the changes to the receivers through the Synchronizer. It has the control of 
local dossiers and their decrypting key. It receives and stores the public keys 
(PKs) of the collaborators. 
The possible point of failure can be a data crash, which can be resolved 
using the usual methods (backup and restore), or the change of data that are 
not under its control: PKs. It cannot send change if it has not the correct PK of 
each receiver. Let be S the sender and R the receiver. If R changes its PK 
before S sends the updates, but communicates this change to Synchronizer 
only after S has already used the old key to encrypt the data, the latter remains 
not accessible (see the sequence diagram in Figure 69). 
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Figure 69 Fault sequence for sender 
There are at least two ways to prevent this situation,: 
 The receiver doesn’t delete the old SK until it receives the explicit 
confirmation from all the collaborator 
 The receiver can request to an owner to send again a dossier (the 
dossierID is clear text, it is ever accessible). 
14.1.2 Receiver 
Receiver is the most delicate component of the system, because it handles 
data that does not belong to it. My system relies on the assumption that 
shared data is never stored in clear form except that in main memory (volatile) 
and then can be accessed only during a session when the receiver obtains the 
related decrypting key. There is no way to prevent malicious external software 
to scan memory to steal the data or to substitute itself to the genuine client 
program. The other actor in communication, the Synchronizer, has no direct 
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access to client, so it receives only information (as authentication) the client 
itself evaluates. 
The same problem exists if information is remotely stored or if it is on paper: 
when it arrives at the final user, it has uncensored access to it (e.g., she can 
photocopy the document or can do a hard copy of the screen). 
To discourage thefts and detect tampering, I plan to use database 
watermarking [26].  
Another discouragement is the change of decrypting key at every update of a 
dossier. If a user is deleted from the receivers’ list but she did a fraudulent 
copy of it, she cannot access the new version which will use a new decrypting 
key. 
14.2 Synchronizer 
A faulty synchronizer can hide a dossier and the related decrypting key or 
can generate fakes. The Synchronizer must always simultaneously manipulate 
a dossier and its decrypting key to not getting caught. To solve this problem, a 
solution can be the use of two non-communicating synchronizers, one for the 
dossiers and the other for the decrypting keys. Neither can add/delete a 
dossier or a decrypting key without the connivance of the other. A 
synchronizer can refute to send a message, but it is immediately unmasked. 
As any other service in the internet, also the Synchronizer can be attacked 
(e.g., with a Denial Of Service attack), but the prevention of these attacks is 
not inherent to this thesis. 
14.3 Network 
14.3.1 Fault 
The network can temporarily go down at distinct moments (see Figure 
70): 
a. Before client’s initial synchronization: the client cannot receive the 
decrypting keys and it cannot access the shared dossiers until network 
returns up. It can still access the owned dossiers, which are stored in 
clear form.  
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b. After the client’s is synchronized, it has the decrypting keys and the 
complete database in memory. Although it may not send/receive 
updates until the network is back up again, it is otherwise fully 
operational. 
c. During synchronization: the client does not receive all the updates, 
therefore it can have an incomplete DB until network returns up. 
However, the client can still use the shared dossiers for which it has 
already received the key. If the network fault happens after the client 
receives a PK or a PR, but before the Synchronizer deletes it, when 
network returns up, the PK will be treated as a new one, without 
consequences nor disruptions. 
 
Figure 70 Possible network faults 
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14.3.2 Redirection 
Let us now consider the well-known “redirection attack”: it happens when 
the network redirects a client to a fake synchronizer. In this case, the client 
sends and receives messages to and from an unknown (malicious?) server Su . 
This type of attack is easily dealt by my architecture, since one of the key 
assumptions is that server Su  is never trusted. Thus the fake Su  cannot access 
data at any time albeit it may damage the system acting as a faulty server as 
described in 14.2. 
14.4 Conclusions 
The detailed analysis in this Section has shown that the proposed 
architecture is effective in blocking all attacks but one, i.e., the Receiver  attack 
(Section 14.1.2). The final data destination, at some point, has the data in the 
clear so at that moment there are no protections. Yet, not all is lost. As I 
discussed before, the use of database watermarking is a good deterrent. Even 
more importantly, the best defence against those attacks is the reduced 
interest of the attacker has in a very small portion of the whole database. Since 
each node contains only the dossiers of its interest, they are a small percentage 
of the total dossiers in the distributed system. T he effort needed to crack open 
a local node, probably would not be worth the bother. 
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15 EXTENDED SCENARIOS 
My architecture is characterized by data privacy protection, distributed database, 
revocation capability, offline work. These peculiarities make it suitable for other scenarios; 
In this Chapter, I show two of them. 
As exposed in Chapter 8-Scenarios, my architecture perfectly fits in a 
Business Collaborative Environment scenario, but it can be easily extended to 
very different situations that have some common characteristics: 
 The collaborating users are geographically scattered; 
 In the network can be present an untrusted element; 
 The percentage of data shared among users in the group is limited; 
 A simultaneous access to the same record is uncommon; 
 The actors are not always online. 
In the following, I will analyze some of these scenarios. 
15.1 Forced cooperation 
I want to enforce the collaboration between a central authority and the 
branch offices. E.g., I want to manage a tender of an untrusted local public 
administration (LPA), where the bids received by the LPA can be read only 
after an expiration date (see Figure 71).  
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Figure 71 A forced cooperation scenario 
 
The bids can be encrypted and then digitally signed and sent to LPA, while the 
deciphering keys have to be stored in a different place, e.g., a repository owned 
by the Central Public Administration (CPA). Neither LPA nor CPA can access 
the bids without exchanging data, so they control each other. LPA cannot alter 
a bid because it is digitally signed, nor can delete a bid because CPA knows its 
existence (it has the related key) and, for the same reason, it cannot add a fake 
bid. 
15.2 Vehicle to Vehicle Communication 
Even in automotive environment there are private data. E.g., in a car 
crash, information on location, number or identity of transported people can 
be used for ulterior motives and then it needs protection (see Figure 72).  
Local Public 
Administration 1
Local Public 
Administration 2
Local Public 
Administration 3Tenders
Tenders
Tenders Opening
Keys
 164 
 
Figure 72 An automotive scenario 
When the accident happens, the cars can transmit information on location, 
damage, garage agreement, etc. to a collector, for example a bus. When the 
bus meets the right breakdown truck, it can communicate these data. This 
situation is characterized by limited time rendezvous between actors. My 
architecture, that allows sporadic access to the network, can be adapted to this 
scenario. 
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16 CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK 
In this paper, I discussed the applicability of outsourced DBMS 
approaches to the Cloud and provided the outline of a simple yet complete 
approach for managing confidential data in public Clouds.  
I am fully aware that a number of problems remain to be solved. A major 
weakness of any data outsourcing scheme is the creation of local copies of data 
after it has been decrypted. If a malicious client decrypts data and then it 
stores the resulting plain-text data in a private location, the protection is 
broken, as the client will be available to access its local copy after being 
revoked. In [22], obfuscated web presentation logic is introduced to prevent 
client from harvesting data. This technique, however, exposes plaintext data to 
Cloud provider. The plain-text data manager is always the weak link in the 
chain and any solution must choose whether to trust the client-side or the 
server-side. A better solution [26] is to watermark the local database to 
provide tamper detection. 
Another issue concerns the degree of trustworthiness of the participants. 
Indeed, untrusted Synchronizer never holds plain-text data; therefore it does 
not introduce an additional Trusted Third Party (TTP) with respect to the 
approaches described at the beginning of the paper. However, I need to trust 
the Synchronizer to execute correctly the protocols explained in this paper. 
This is a determining factor that my technique shares with competing 
approaches and, although an interesting topic, it lies beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
In experiment phase, I introduced a simple solution to row-level encryption of 
databases using IMDBs. It can be used in the Cloud to manage very granular 
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access rights in a highly distributed database. This allows for stronger 
confidence in the privacy of shared sensitive data. 
An interesting field of application is the use in (business) cooperative 
environments, e.g. professional networks. In these environments, privacy is a 
priority, but low computing resources don't allow the use of slow and complex 
algorithms. IMDBs and my smart encryption, instead, achieve the goal in a 
more effective way. 
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APPENDIX A PUBLICATIONS 
1. E. Damiani and F. Pagano, “Handling confidential data on the 
untrusted Cloud: an agent-based approach,” Cloud 
Computing 2010, pp. 61-67 
 
Abstract 
Cloud computing allows shared computer and storage facilities to 
be used by a multitude of clients. While Cloud management is 
centralized, the information resides in the Cloud and information 
sharing can be implemented via off-the-shelf techniques for multiuser 
databases. Users, however, are very diffident for not having full control 
over their sensitive data. Untrusted database-as-a-server techniques 
are neither readily extendable to the Cloud environment nor easily 
understandable by non-technical users. To solve this problem, I present 
an approach where agents share reserved data in a secure manner by 
the use of simple grant-and-revoke permissions on shared data. 
 
2. D. Pagano and F. Pagano, “Using in-memory encrypted 
databases on the Cloud,” IWSSC 2011, pp. 30-37 
 
Abstract 
Storing data in the Cloud poses a number of privacy issues. A way to 
handle them is supporting data replication and distribution on the 
Cloud via a local, centrally synchronized storage. In this paper I 
propose to use an in-memory RDBMS with row-level data encryption 
 173 
for granting and revoking access rights to distributed data. T his type of 
solution is rarely adopted in conventional RDBMSs because it requires 
several complex steps. In this paper I focus on implementation and 
benchmarking of a test system, which shows that my simple yet 
effective solution overcomes most of the problems. 
 
3. E. Damiani, F. Pagano and D. Pagano, “iPrivacy: a 
Distributed Approach to Privacy on the Cloud”, in press, 
International Journal On Advances in Security 
 
Abstract 
The increasing adoption of Cloud storage poses a number of privacy 
issues. Users wish to preserve full control over their sensitive data and 
cannot accept that it to be accessible by the remote storage provider. 
Previous research was made on techniques to protect data stored on 
untrusted servers; however I argue that the Cloud architecture presents 
a number of open issues. To handle them, I present an approach where 
confidential data is stored in a highly distributed database, partly 
located on the Cloud and partly on the clients. Data is shared in a 
secure manner using a simple grant-and-revoke permission of shared 
data and I have developed a system test implementation, using an in 
memory RDBMS with row-level data encryption for fine-grained data 
access control. 
 
